

JOINT INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT: SHOULD THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE CONSOLIDATE ALL FUNCTIONS
UNDER A SINGLE AGENCY?

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General Studies

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

JOINT INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT: SHOULD THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONSOLIDATE ALL FUNCTIONS UNDER A SINGLE AGENCY?, by MAJ Nathanael S. Tagg, 128 pages.

In today's increasingly fiscally conscious environment, the Department of Defense must examine new ways of executing existing missions more efficiently. Given the basic core commonality of installation management functions within the current operating environment, one area the Department of Defense should consider examining is consolidation of installation management functions into a single agency or joint command. While each military department delivers virtually identical installation management services, the current organizational structures and methods used vary greatly. This thesis examines the installation management organizational framework of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, and Department of the Navy (including both Navy and Marine Corps) within the context of Defense Department guidance and existing laws such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, BRAC 2005, and Title 10 U.S. Code so that the feasibility of a future consolidation effort might be determined and areas for further study proposed.

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Thanks to Colonel Perry Helton for giving me the opportunity to broaden my knowledge and experience while assigned to the United States Army Garrison Japan which started me on the path to writing this thesis. Without your trust in me to tackle the big problems in USAG-J, I wouldn't have opened myself to the strategic possibilities for installation management outlined in my thesis.

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ACRONYMS

ACSIM	Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Installation Management
ADCON	Administrative Control
AFRPA	Air Force Real Property Agency
AFSVA	Air Force Services Agency
BASEOPS	Base Operations
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CLS	Common Levels of Support
CNIC	Commander, Naval Installation Command
COLS	Common Output Level Standards
DES	Directorate of Emergency Services
DPTMS	Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DRRS	Defense Readiness Reporting System
DRU	Direct Reporting Unit (Army)
FMM	Facilities Modernization Model
FOM	Facilities Operations Model
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IMA	United States Army Installation Management Agency
IMCOM	United States Army Installation Management Command
ISSA	Inter Service Support Agreement
MACOM	Major Command (Army)

MCICOM	United States Marine Corps Installation Management Command
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MILCON	Military Construction
MWR	Morale Welfare and Recreation
NAVFAC	Naval Facility Engineering Command
NDS	National Defense Strategy
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
SES	Senior Executive Service
SGO	Standard Garrison Organization
SRM	Sustainment, Restoration, and Maintenance
TECOM	Marine Corps Training and Education Command
UFC	Uniform Facilities Criteria
UFGS	Uniform Facilities Guide Specifications
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

With the American political system actively seeking areas to reduce deficit spending, there have been many calls for a reduction in military expenditures after over ten years of war. With this clamor reaching its crescendo following the drawdown in Iraq in the form of sequestration legislation tied to balanced federal budgets, change looms on the horizon for the United States Military. Faced with significant across the board cuts, maintaining the status quo is no longer an option. While the low hanging fruit of programmatic cuts such as the F-22 have already been decided upon, there are still areas within the Department of Defense (DoD) where efficiencies can be achieved. While assigned to the United States Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM) as the Garrison Executive Officer for the United States Army Garrison Japan, I personally observed areas within the installation management field where DoD might look for some of these efficiencies.

Both the Garrison Commander and I routinely travelled to Okinawa to conduct coordination with the Air Force and Marine Corps. What we found was many of the functions our local staff deemed essential were in fact performed by other services in close proximity where an economy of scale could be produced so all service components would have shared responsibility for providing the service. While there were certain budgetary restrictions inherent in achieving such a solution, we laid the groundwork for changes on a small scale related to some of our Soldier support programs in Okinawa. One of the trends we noted throughout our visits was the duplication of efforts by the Army, in virtually every area of garrison functions, for marginal benefit. We proposed

that the predominant user be designated “executive agent” for the function with additional personnel resources and funding applied against the delta for Army required capability versus sister-service delivered capability. Our approach was to deliver comparable service with reduced overhead.

As IMCOM looked to execute a budget decrement of up to 33% in 2008 – 2010, we sought out innovative ways to cut costs and realign functions to meet the challenge. More importantly, we observed the same pattern as in Okinawa among the larger Garrison commands on Japan, as well as in the duplicated overhead in Korea’s installation management structure and at the Regional level within the services. While our scope was limited to the mandate of providing service to the assigned and supported Army and DoD populations at our installations and sites, the experience in Japan begged the larger question of why hasn’t DoD combined similar installation management functions across the services into a unified command or agency that can better administer and provide a single common level of support at a more efficient cost?

Since restructuring was a large portion of our ability to meet this emergent requirement, the question arises as to whether there is broader applicability to our seemingly simple solution. If so, it naturally follows that DoD should take the same perspective on a macro level and consider major realignment as part of any proposed cost measures to be enacted. Given the constrained fiscal budget for the foreseeable future, should the Department of Defense consider combining all installations support functions under a single DoD agency in order to achieve efficiencies, standardize support across DoD, and further the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986?

This thesis centers on the trends within DoD concerning both existing organizational structure and joint organization requirements and applies it to the current operating environment wherein it must constantly look for new, better ways to do business. Consolidation of installation support functions under a single agency is one such way to achieve both cost savings and cost avoidance for the near term that will carry forward into long range planning. Supporting questions to the thesis include: What are the similarities and differences between the service components' organization structures and service delivery? How is DoD organized as a whole for installation management? Where are the gaps between current practice and joint intent? Is there a good model to use from a DoD agency that has already gone through this process? What potential problems could occur from such a transformation?

This research is significant to the future of the Army and in the broader sense to the entire Department of Defense. Rather than cutting additional critical programs or forcing debilitating cuts in operational force structure, realignment of existing installation support functions to achieve efficiencies seems to be a path DoD should follow. This research may prompt the right questions to be asked by senior leadership and initiate technical research to determine exactly how large of financial benefit can be derived from such a proposal.

My research on this subject is limited to current practices and both historical and currently documented organization, purpose, and requirements for installation support within DoD. This thesis will describe and analyze the current state of DoD installation support functions. The period of inclusive analysis will be from roughly 1982 until present. This period covers the background debate on Goldwater-Nichols through the

most recent organizational changes resultant from Army transformation. Each of the services experienced significant structural changes related to installation management throughout this period, prompted by major events such as the end of the Cold War and the initiation of the Global War on Terror.

This research will not attempt to prove, through fiscal comparison or trending analysis, any potential cost savings. A key assumption, based on previously published CBO and GAO estimates, is that consolidation of government agencies does save money. Referring back to the limited joint basing experiment currently underway following BRAC 2005, for a one time implementation cost of \$50.6 million spread over 12 proposed joint base groupings, DoD was able to achieve an immediate payback with projected annual recurring savings of \$183.8 million and a 20 year savings of \$2,342.5 million.¹ The specific methods and amounts to be saved are a subject for continued future research in this field. Likewise, this thesis will avoid treating the National Guard or Reserves as part of its scope. Because of the complications arising from state control versus federal control in this area, expansion of the consolidation idea to apply for the National Guard or Reserves is an area for future research. Finally, this research is limited to application in a joint environment. Although a method or organization discussed within the research may be working flawlessly as is by an individual service component, my analysis will critique it against the joint perspective and analyze it from a DoD perspective.

¹Department of Defense, “Base Closure and Realignment Report,” vol 1, part 2 of 2: Detailed Recommendations, May 2005, www.defense.gov/brac/pdf/vol_i_part_2_dod_brac.pdf (accessed 5 December 2012), 43.

Terms defined as part of this thesis are described below. A complete listing can be found in the glossary. This is the manner in which these terms are used within the context of this thesis.

Common Levels of Support (CLS). CLS is “a coordinated, corporate strategy for transforming installation services management by focusing on service delivery costs and performance. Through CLS, the Army expects to achieve three objectives:

Standardized installation services: Installation customers receive the same elements of service, to the same level of service, regardless of the installation at which they are located (flexible for unique missions, geographic or demographic considerations)

Accountability for service delivery performance: Garrisons report service delivery performance quarterly and are held responsible for meeting performance targets

Equitable distribution of available resources: Available resources will be distributed effectively across garrisons so each has adequate resources to deliver installation services to an expected standard.²

Common Output Level Standards (COLS). “Output or performance level standards established by the Department of Defense for installation support using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output performance metrics, and cost drivers for each installation support function. These standards provide a description of the capability associated with the particular installation support function. Where appropriate, standards will be tiered to provide options for managing risk.”³

²LTG Robert Wilson, *Command Performance: Telling the Army Story* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2008), http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-ExclusivePubs/Special%20Reports/SR_APR08.pdf (accessed 3 December 2012).

³Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 4001.01, *Installation Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 10 January 2008, incorporating change 1, 15 November 2011), 1.

Cost Avoidance. “Cost avoidances are defined as all cost reductions that are not savings. These can include, but are not limited to, improvements in efficiency, reductions in unit cost, and reductions in the projected cost of unfinanced requirements.”⁴

Cost reduction. “A cost reduction is a reduction in the number of dollars needed to meet a customer-established requirement by executing a certain process or function. All cost reductions are categorized as savings or cost avoidance.”⁵

Cost Savings. “Savings are defined as cost reductions that enable a manager to remove programmed or budgeted funds and apply them to other uses. In this definition, savings are viewed from an Army-wide perspective: an initiative that reduces costs in one organization or appropriation but increases costs elsewhere represents savings only to the extent that there is a net cost reduction that can be applied to other uses.”⁶

Emergency Services. A field within installation management containing those services required to address emergency conditions. Dependant upon which military service, this area may contain Fire and Emergency Services (ambulance capability), Security Personnel, and Military Police or equivalent.

Installation. Any base, camp, post, station, yard, depot, center, or other area under the control of the Department of Defense or a military department. This includes areas located outside the United States. Smaller installation are often referred to as sites or sub-installations depending on the military department.

⁴IMA Business Improvement-Lean Six Sigma, “Glossary of Terms,” 18 August 2006, <http://www.ima.army.mil/sites/plans/lss.asp> (accessed 5 December 2012), 1.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., 3.

Installation Assets. “All Natural and constructed assets associated with owning, managing, and operating an installation, including the facilities, people, and internal and external environment.”⁷

Installation Management. The functional area within DoD concerning all aspects related to both facilities management and support services delivery. Categorization and organization for service delivery varies by military department.

Installation Support. “Any of the five categories of services and support activities through which the Department of Defense engages in life-cycle management of its installations: Facilities, Services, Family Housing, Environment, and Base Realignment and Closure. Program element definitions for facilities, environment, and other installation support functions are maintained by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) and Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE).”⁸

Military Department. “The executive part of the department and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the department. When used with respect to the Department of Defense, such term means the executive part of the department, including the executive parts of the military departments, and all field headquarters, forces, reserve

⁷Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, *Defense Installations Posture Statement 2007* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 4.

⁸Ibid.

components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of Defense, including those of the military departments.⁹

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR). A grouping of support and leisure services provided by any one of a number of different agencies or commands depending on which military department one is referring to. When used by the Army it becomes FMWR adding Family to the term. MWR activities are funded by a combination of appropriated funds and non-appropriated funds (NAF) collected through business operations. MWR activities benefit Soldiers, their families, civilian employees, and military retirees.

Real Property. As related to installation management this term refers to the land itself, any permanent physical structures such airfields, parking lots, buildings, cement pads, and fencing, or infrastructure such as utilities, sewer, roads, etc. found on a DoD installation.

Services. Any of a number of categories of support provided to individuals and military organizations falling under the umbrella of installation management. While organization and method may vary, service delivery is common to the management processes of each military department.

⁹10 USC Sec. 101(a)(6).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The body of work for this topic is limited primarily to government produced memorandums, briefings, regulations, directives and policy. Not much has been written on the field of joint installation management. Among the few exceptions to this are articles pertaining to joint basing initiatives stemming from BRAC 2005. While a number of publications have been produced, the most useful information is available directly from the government's websites. As such, the literature review breaks down between government documents, third party commentary, and primary source articles. Government documents are by far the most numerous category.

At its basic level, a literature review for this topic relies heavily on existing official government documents as a proscriptive base to inform subsequent discussion. These documents pertaining to any possible consolidation of functions currently executed by the individual services fall into two primary categories: law and guidance. In an ideal situation, there will be little divergence between what is currently legally required and what is currently being executed according to published guidance. The first law that must be examined is Title 10, United States Code (USC) which delineates the basic service responsibility for installation management.

Title 10 USC refers to the portion of Federal Law outlining the legal basis for the roles, missions and organization of the Department of Defense and each of the military services. It is divided into five subtitles each dealing with a separate aspect of DoD:

Subtitle A - General Military Law, including Uniform Code of Military Justice

Subtitle B - Army

Subtitle C - Navy and Marine Corps

Subtitle D - Air Force

Subtitle E - Reserve Components

Each Subtitled section contains numerous chapters dealing with the operation and structure of each military service. While the details pertaining to Title 10 USC will be discussed in chapter 4, in broad terms it establishes that the Department of Defense is authorized to create new defense agencies when the role to be performed impacts multiple areas or services within DoD. Likewise, with regards to installation management, each military service must manage its bases and is responsible for servicing. Interestingly, the term “servicing” is not defined within Title 10. Title 10 is Federal Law and can be amended as such by Congress so as to allow adaptation to changing requirements. This is a routine procedure, as reflected by the numerous amendments contained within the source documents.¹⁰

Added to this foundation is the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which made sweeping changes to Title 10, USC. Goldwater-Nichols stemmed from repeated failures by the military services to make meaningful gains in joint operating capability on their own. Goldwater-Nichols stated purpose was to:

reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness

¹⁰Title 10, USC.

of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.¹¹

Described as “one of the landmark laws of American history” by then-chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin in 1986, Goldwater-Nichols redefined the command structure of the Department of Defense, strengthening the civilian control, improving information flow to the President, and redefining the roles of the services in terms of warfighting.¹²

There is a great deal of writing referencing Goldwater-Nichols since it was such an important, and at the times controversial, piece of legislation. The focus of this thesis, however, is the applicability of certain portions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Necessarily, studies concerning the power shift within DoD, the joint education and credentialing requirements, or the roles of the combatant commanders are excluded from the scope of this study. Rather, the applicability of the last three sections of Goldwater-Nichols providing for “more efficient use of defense resources,” “joint officer management policies” and improving “the management and administration of the Department of Defense” are the focus of the body of literature referenced within this thesis.¹³ This limitation significantly reduces the available references since it represents a very small portion of the overall professional discourse.

¹¹Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 1.

¹²James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1996): 10-11.

¹³*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 1.

Coming eleven years after Goldwater-Nichols, the Base Reorganization and Closure Act of 2005 was the fifth BRAC round since 1988 and served as the next major impetus for writing about “jointness” and, specifically, joint basing. Over a period of four months, the Commission “conducted 182 site visits, held 20 legislative and deliberative hearings, hosted 20 regional hearings, and received well over 200,000 written and electronic communications from the public” in order to present its recommendations to the President.¹⁴ Closing 22 installations and realigning 33, BRAC 2005 was estimated to save DoD roughly \$4.2 billion annually.¹⁵

Convinced that major efficiencies could be achieved in locations where multiple service components operated in close proximity, Congress required “consolidation” for 26 of the installations recommended for realignment into 12 “joint bases” as part of the BRAC. By eliminating duplicated systems and overhead, DoD would increase the efficiency of the remaining systems, save money in the process, and improve the joint capability at the selected bases.¹⁶ While certainly opposed at the time, the concept has been largely validated during the intervening years since BRAC 2005. Joint basing served as a limited test for some of the underlying concepts underscoring this thesis and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 4.

¹⁴Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, “Cover Letter to the President of the United States,” 8 September 2005, www.brac.gov/finalreport.html (accessed 5 December 2012).

¹⁵Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, “Executive Summary,” 8 September 2005, www.brac.gov/finalreport.html (accessed 5 December 2012), iii.

¹⁶Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report*, 8 September 2005, www.brac.gov/finalreport.html (accessed 5 December 2012), Volume 1, Chapters 1-4.

The guidance on the other hand, consists of the current National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Posture statement as well as existing DoD regulations and directives. Subordinate doctrine within the services matches the intent of the DoD guidance and federal law to varying degrees, depending on interpretation. Much has been written on this interpretation, both internal to the department and by outside commentators and thinktanks. The actual organization of the military departments for execution on the other hand, has a much smaller body of literature, and surprisingly, the most insightful sources are insider briefings rather than official publications in many cases. This is most likely due to the relatively new changes occurring in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Because the Army pursued installation management consolidation much earlier, it has had ample time to publish its doctrine, analyze its missteps, make changes, and write about the results.

Review of the Army, Air Force, and Navy installation management organizations and methods reveals several broad focus areas for analysis. First, given the length of time since Goldwater-Nichols, how much each service has proactively moved towards the “jointness” ideal often seems to depend upon how much fiscally restraining activities limited or modified the service’s behaviors. A 1996 GAO report noted “downsizing and reduced defense budgets in recent years are now causing the services to take a renewed interest in trying to achieve greater economies, efficiencies, and cost savings in base operations.”¹⁷ As an example, the Air Force began pursuit of installation management

¹⁷Government Accountability Office, *Military Bases: Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs Are Being Missed*, 23 April 1996, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-108/html/GAOREPORTS-NSIAD-96-108.htm> (accessed 4 December 2012).

reform only when primary efforts to address budget shortfalls could not be adequately addressed through personnel cuts.

After 40,000 personnel cuts failed to provide the needed funding to satisfy operational needs, the Air Force began looking towards its infrastructure budget. This is evidenced by the fact that by recapitalization had caused base operations and maintenance to be funded at only 64% for fiscal year 2008.¹⁸ Second, depending on when such changes were made determines how much has been written on the topic academically or professionally. The newer consolidations of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps made it extremely difficult to find a sufficient body of evidence stemming from professional writing, due to the fact that many of these changes are ongoing. The Air Force reached full operating capacity for its major installation management consolidation in October of this year while the Marine Corps stood up Marine Corps Installation Management Command (MCICOM) at the start of 2012.

Generally, DoD has published specific guidance regarding evaluation and standardization of installation support functions; however, each department is organized quite differently. The Army's Installation Management Command (IMCOM) model appears to be the most advanced in terms of consolidation of functions. Comprised of a centralized command structure and vertical integration, it is responsible for all aspects of installation management for Army installations.¹⁹ The Air Force, and to a lesser extent the Navy and Marine Corps, have older or incomplete models from which the Army

¹⁸Colonel Jeffrey A. Vinger, "Future Air Bases: Power Patches or Military Communities?" *Air Force Journal of Logistics* 32, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 16-27.

¹⁹Jeffery P. Burbach and J. Elise Van Pool, eds., "Installation Management Command: A Short History 2011-2010," *Army Publishing Directorate*, October 2010.

departed with the establishment of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) that later grew into IMCOM. While IMCOM consolidated all installation management functions under a single organization, both the Navy and Air Force continue to split the DoD designated Installation Support functions among several different organizations or field agencies. This will be analyzed in detail through the second portion of chapter 4.

At the DoD level, trends clearly show policy supporting a consolidation continuing to be set. However, like the Air Force and Navy models, certain functions are split out to different areas within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While the principal agent responsible is the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and the Environment, linkages to the departments are often less clear.

It is important to note that installation management specific progression towards jointness is not the only area the DoD has focused on per Goldwater-Nichols. Other key areas include transportation, Special Forces, and medical services. While the first two areas resulted in establishment of Unified Joint Commands (TRANSCOM and SOCOM), the third area is still very much an ongoing debate. Despite significant steps taken towards jointness since Goldwater-Nichols, the medical services area remains largely under the discretion of the individual components. The history and reasons for this will be discussed in chapter 5 as an example of the challenges DoD would face as if it seeks to establish a unified installation management command.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research methodology used in this thesis is a documentation review and organizational structure analysis. Documentation review initially builds a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter and provides a background framework for the later analysis. Documentation review likewise serves to establish the authority for action based on national policy and federal law. Because the available material spans such a breadth, there is no requirement for additional data collection in order to prove or disprove the basic assumptions of the thesis. The organizational structure analysis on the other hand takes an in-depth look at the current structure of DoD and each of the departments within the context of the documentation review.

Specifically, the first part of this methodology, the documentation review, reviews federal law, DoD policy, and senior leader guidance, instruction and directives concerning joint integration to frame the issue and provide the basis for comparison and later assessment. Although many such documents were reviewed, only the most important are discussed in detail within the thesis. Many more such references appear within the bibliography however, as they were instrumental in building a frame of reference. The additional breakdown within the first section of chapter 4 between existing law and existing guidance also allows for an in-depth review and informs potential problems relating to the overall thesis. Key strategic documents and established Department of Defense level policies and instruction comprise the guidance portion while an examination of Title 10 USC, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of

1986, and the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 2005 make up the federal laws relative to the scope of this paper.

Following review and analysis of the law and guidance, this research seeks to outline and analyze the existing structures and organization of the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Department of Air Force pertaining to installation management functions. Examination of DoD level functions must occur prior to the individual service examinations so as to illuminate linkages between service structure and policy oversight. As the first service chronologically to implement a separate installation management structure, the Army organization will be reviewed first among the service components so as to provide a basis for comparison for newer implementation models of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. This is also appropriate given this paper, while proposing a joint consolidation, is written by an Army officer for an Army entity.

During the organizational analysis, specific attention must be paid to the differences between DoD policy and the manner in which the military components understand and execute variants of those policies. Likewise, identification of current structure and the justification thereof is of the utmost importance as I attempt to deconstruct each of the components' rationale for its current organization. Finally, identification of current organizational mindset is an ever present theme which permeates this research and helps inform on potential challenges or opportunities outlined in chapter 5.

The final portion of this methodology is to draw relevant conclusions from the above analysis as pertaining to the primary and secondary research questions. Following

review and analysis of available information and interviews, I will assess the current execution and potential for consolidation of functions at the DoD level guided by three primary questions:

1. Does this action support current published strategic guidance?
2. Is this action in compliance with, and meet the intent of, existing federal law?
3. Does this action help the Department of Defense substantially pursue overall jointness?

Secondary outcomes supporting these primary drivers include identification of key problem areas currently existing within the organizational structure, assessing how those problem areas might impact a consolidation effort, and proposing possible methods DoD might look to for more research or to formulate answers.

Whether the thesis is proved valid or not, this paper seeks to propose further areas for research on this topic and to identify potential friction points. It will also attempt to identify any interim recommendations that can be implemented in order to set the conditions for possible future pursuit of joint management of installation functions. The final step in this methodology is to recommend, based on the results of the research, whether DoD should invest resources into developing the premise of the thesis and provide a broad recommendation for a way ahead. Advocating specific actions or structures is outside the scope of my thesis but the intent is to provide a useful recommendation to DoD that will help future policy development.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Governing Law, Policy, and Regulation

Title 10 United States Code

As the most basic foundation of the authorizations and requirements that outline the Department of Defense and each of the military services, Title 10 USC is the law outlining the basic structure and responsibilities for the military of the United States. Routinely amended over time to account for the changing nature of our society and the operating environment, Title 10 USC must first be examined in order to lay the foundation for other laws, many of which are reflected as changes within Title 10.

As pertains to this thesis, several sections of Title 10 USC must be examined in detail. First, authority currently exists within Section 191 a. allowing the Secretary of Defense to “provide for the performance of a supply or service activity that is common to more than one military department by a single agency of the Department of Defense.”²⁰ Installation management activities would fall under the “services” portion of Section 191 a in that they are not unique to each service, but rather something each branch of the military must do which does not differ significantly from the other services. Other portions of Title 10 USC outline specific military department responsibilities however.

The Department of the Army’s responsibilities with regards to installation management lies in Sec. 3013 stating that the Secretary of the Army is responsible for “construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the

²⁰10 USC, Section 191 a.

acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.”²¹ Likewise, both the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force are given the exact same responsibility in sections 5013 and 8013 respectively. This essentially puts the responsibility for real property, military construction, and sustainment, restoration, and maintenance (SRM) directly in the hands of the individual secretaries. Similarly, section 3013(b)6 gives the Secretary of the Army responsibility for “servicing.”²² The Navy and Air Force are again similarly worded.

It is also important to note 10 USC section 125, subject to section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) states that while “the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate action (including the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of any function, power, or duty) to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation, and to eliminate duplication, in the Department of Defense,” he may not substantially change, transfer, reassign, consolidate, or abolish “a function, power, or duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof” if specifically mentioned by law.²³ Complicating the situation further is the concept of expeditionary basing operations and permanent joint basing and how they fit into the outlined powers. As part of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), referred to as the Global Posture Review, DoD develops criteria “for assessing, with respect to each type of facility specified . . . that is to be located in a foreign country.” 10 USC makes no distinction between locations or shared installations.

²¹10 USC, sec 3303.b(12).

²²10 USC, sec 3303.b.(6).

²³10 USC, sec 125.a.

Essentially, while the Secretary of Defense is tasked to find ways to make the department run more efficiently, effectively, and economically, he may not make such changes if they are incorporated into existing law. Thus, the first obstacle to overcome in the consolidation of installation management functions is to convince Congress to pass legislation modifying the wording of the services responsibilities or adding a specific exemption for the areas required.

Goldwater Nichols

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act introduced sweeping changes to the military command structure and roles within DoD designed to strengthen civilian authority in DoD, improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to clarify responsibility and authority for commanders of unified and specified combatant commands, and to place greater emphasis on strategy formulation. The act also focused on efficient use of defense resources, joint officer management, and improving the overall administrative and managerial effectiveness of DoD. Of the eight specified desired policy outcomes of the legislation, three apply directly to the focus of this paper. These areas are “to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, and otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.”²⁴

²⁴Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 2.

Like many reforms within DoD, fiscal responsibility and the ability to find and implement efficiencies permeate the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Along these lines, Chapter 8, Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities, subsection 191 states “whenever the Secretary of Defense determines such action would be more effective, economical, or efficient, the Secretary may provide for the performance of a supply or service activity that is common to more than one military department by a single agency of the Department of Defense.”²⁵ This specific language within the Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in the dissolution and consolidation of existing missions and functions within the individual departments and the creation of organizations such as TRANSCOM. The same justification has been used more recently to successfully combine training for the joint strike fighter and is currently underpins the ongoing DoD desire to consolidate medical assets under a TRANSCOM-like combined unified Medical Command structure. Proposed several times across the years beginning in 1991 with a Defense Department Directive such an organization would provide common standards for training, logistics, and operations. In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it would eliminate replicated processes across the services and in 2006, when the Defense Business Board provided its recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, would have saved the military more than \$344 million over several years.²⁶

²⁵Ibid., 29.

²⁶James G. Sanders, “Combining Force? Why a Joint Medical Command Could be Only a Matter of Time,” Defense Web, 2006, <http://www.defenseweb.com/display.aspx?moduleid=8cde2e88-3052-448c-893d-d0b4b14b31c4&CategoryID=aaf6aa5e-0f70-4849-bbad-cb5bc66ae715&ObjectID=5497e17a-2f4d-4c3e-927d-5636e3d3eaa5> (accessed 27 October 2012).

Along these lines, Section 302 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act defines a Defense Agency as meaning an organization:

(A) that is established by the Secretary of Defense under section 191 of this title (or under the second sentence of section 125(d) of this title (as in effect before the date of the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986)) to perform a supply or service activity common to more than one military department (other than such an entity that is designated by the Secretary as a Department of Defense Field Activity); or
(B) that is designated by the Secretary of Defense as a Defense Agency.²⁷

Key to this study's analysis is the second clause which allows for the Secretary of Defense to designate such agencies. No limits are placed on the creation of new agencies other than the requirements in Section 303 which stipulate that:

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of the functions and organizational structure of the Defense Agencies and Department of Defense Field Activities. The study shall determine the most effective, economical, or efficient means of providing supply or service activities common to more than one military department.²⁸

Creating new defense agencies or field activities then becomes allowable so long as creation fulfills the purpose of improving the efficiency of DoD to operate a function more cost effectively or operate more effectively. This authority to create new defense agencies under conditions where these stipulations are met is the central authority on which this paper's thesis rests.

While the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to improve the warfighting interoperability of the services and advice provided to the President, it was also designed to force such a culture on the military services. This new responsibility calls for the

²⁷Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, 32.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 33.

Secretary of Defense to “establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly trained in, oriented toward, joint matters.”²⁹ Accordingly, the legislation then defines “joint matters” as “matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to -

- (1) national military strategy;
- (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and
- (3) command and control of combat operations under unified Command.³⁰

As defined, the creation of a new Defense Agency, inherently joint in nature, manned by Department of Defense civilians and officers from each of the services, would seem to meet the definitions outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and support such a joint officer management effort, particularly in light of the new expeditionary posture of today’s Defense Department.

Base Realignment and Closure Act 2005

BRAC 2005 represented the most significant step forward for the installation management community to date. As General Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, wrote to the Senate Armed Services Committee,

To ensure the security challenges of the 21st Century are met, we must continue to transform the joint force . . . in an environment where resources are scarce, we must eliminate excess physical capacity to allow for increased defense capability focused on “jointness.”³¹

²⁹Ibid., 35.

³⁰Ibid., 39-40.

³¹Richard B. Myers, Letter to Hon. John W. Warner, Chairman, Armed Service Committee, 3 June 2003.

Outlined under Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 159, section 2687, Base Closures and Realignment, BRAC was originally conceived of as a way to divest excess cold-war infrastructure and realize significant cost savings. More importantly, it came about because of a demonstrated inability of Congress to effectively close excess basing structure once they had seized control of authority to do so from the Executive branch and DoD.³² Even so, BRAC proved to be a learning process as the early BRAC rounds entailed significant controversy and debate, usually over the parochialism between the services. Moreover, “the stovepipe structure of the earlier rounds of BRAC allowed the services to analyze infrastructure and make service closure and realignment recommendations under the law without seeking synergies of cross-service coordination.”³³

Unlike previous BRAC rounds that focused solely on cost savings related to realignment and reduction of cold-war infrastructure, BRAC 2005 included implementation of opportunities for greater joint activity as one of its primary outcomes. BRAC 2005 also changed the means by which DoD provided its recommendations. Previous BRAC analyses considered functions on a service-by service basis rather than as

³²Robert C. Powers, “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005: Congressional Dialogue and Decision” (Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2003), 7-10.

³³John A. Lathroum, “The Transformational Quality of Base Realignment and Closure 2005” (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006), 3.

a whole under a joint perspective. As a result, cross-service functions were not identified, included, or leveraged in the recommendations to Congress.³⁴

Even so, BRAC 2005 was a hard sell for the DoD. Many Congressmen and Senators debated the timing, given U.S. involvement in the Global War on Terror and Iraq, and the numerous unknowns about future threats and force postures. In particular, the new included language referring to “jointness” confused some members of the legislature. Senator Trent Lott (R, Mississippi) summarized this attitude during his debate on an amendment to the defense authorization bill designed to repeal the upcoming BRAC 2005 questioning “Jointness: Does the base possess multiservice functionability? What does that mean, we are going to combine Air Force and Navy pilot training? Have we thought that through?”³⁵ Indeed, prior to the 2005 BRAC, little consideration for joint criteria had been demonstrated by either the DoD or Congress when submitting or approving the BRAC recommendations.

BRAC 2005 served as a means to not only achieve elimination of excess infrastructure, but also to reshape the military, pursue “jointness,” optimize military readiness, and to realize significant savings in support of DoD transformation.³⁶ As such, it represented a significant departure for DoD through formalization of processes to achieve the desired increase in “jointness.” As outlined in SECDEF guidance on

³⁴Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, *Transformation through Base Realignment and Closure* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 November 2002), 2.

³⁵U.S. Senate, Proceedings and Debates of the 108th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate, Congressional Record 149, no. 81 (S7289), 4 June 2003.

³⁶Air Education and Training Command, “Joint Basing,” <http://www.aetc.af.mil/library/jointbasing/index.asp> (accessed 14 May 2012).

transformation to the secretaries, joint cross-service analytical teams would now be included in the leadership model as shown below in Figure 1. Rumsfeld created two new OSD level groups to implement the desired changes. The new Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary, would serve as the policy-making and oversight body for the entire process. The other, subordinate group, would be the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Testing, and Logistics. The ISG would be responsible for providing detailed direction necessary to complete the BRAC 2005 analyses.³⁷




Figure 1. BRAC 2005 Leadership

Source: Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, *Transformation through Base Realignment and Closure* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 15 November 2002), 4.

³⁷David E. Lockwood, *Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, May 2005), 3-4.

Joint Basing

One of the key stipulations under BRAC 2005 was for DoD to identify and implement a joint basing structure for selected bases. By creating such a joint organizational and basing solution, the intent was to “facilitate multi-service missions, reduce waste, save money, and free up resources to recruit quality people, modernize equipment and infrastructure, and develop the capabilities needed to meet 21st century threats.”³⁸ The specific recommendations noted that

All installations employ military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform common functions in support of installation facilities and personnel. All installations execute these functions using similar or near similar processes. Because these installations share a common boundary with minimal distance between the major facilities or are in near proximity, there is significant opportunity to reduce duplication of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities requirements capable of generating savings, which will be realized by paring unnecessary management personnel and achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale.³⁹

Additional savings were expected to result from a combination of service contract optimization and consolidation, better utilization of both facilities and infrastructure, reduction of owned and contracted commercial fleets of vehicles and equipment, consolidation of regional management structures.⁴⁰

Under BRAC 2005 twelve locations were consolidated to form joint bases. Installation management functions at McChord Air Force Base, Fort Dix, Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, Naval Air Facility Washington, Bolling Air Force Base, Henderson Hall, Fort Richardson, Hickam Air Force Base, Fort Sam Houston, Randolph

³⁸Air Education and Training Command.

³⁹Department of Defense, “Base Closure and Realignment Report,” 41-42.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 42.

Air Force Base, Naval Weapons Station Charleston, Fort Eustis, Fort Story, and Anderson Air Force Base were realigned to other nearby bases in order to achieve desired efficiencies.⁴¹ The twelve gaining locations where DoD consolidated these functions, by service responsibility are:

Navy Lead:

Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii
Naval Base Guam (Anderson), Guam
Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling-Naval Research Lab, Washington, DC
Naval Station Norfolk (Ft. Story), Virginia

Army Lead:

Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Virginia

Air Force Lead:

JB Andrews – Naval Air Facility Washington
Charleston Air Force Base (Naval Weapons Station Charleston) South Carolina
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey
Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska
Langley Air Force Base (Ft. Eustis), Virginia
Joint Base San Antonio, Texas (Lackland AFB, Fort Sam Houston, Randolph AFB)⁴²

DoD's two phased approach began with the first joint bases established on 1 October 2009 and the remaining seven established 1 October 2010. Prior to establishment, each joint base had to reach Initial Operating Capability (IOC) during an eight month trial period. Each base executed a phased transfer that culminated in transfer of budgetary responsibility and resources over to the designated lead service for each base. Civilian personnel, funds, contracts, and real property all transferred to the lead service for each base and thus became subject to the lead service's policies and

⁴¹Ibid., 41.

⁴²Air Education and Training Command.

procedures unless specified in other policy established by either the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBIG) or other OSD policy. Service members of the supported service did not transfer to the lead service but were integrated into the joint base's installation support structure.⁴³

Despite the significant progress made through the two phased implementation (See Appendix B) of the twelve joint bases, significant challenges remain. For instance, when developing Common Output Levels Standards (COLS), Installation Capabilities Council (ICC) members generally selected the highest standard among the services rather than the average. This resulted in increased cost as joint bases had to increase delivered support from existing levels that did not meet the "highest available" standard used to formulate the COLS. Further problems with COLS included that they were not weighted to warfighting functions, did not provide alternate means to accomplish the function, nor were they weighted based on urgency. Further, because some of COLS were unclear in the measurement criteria, reporting from joint bases was not standardized as it arrived at the OSD Basing Directorate making it difficult to judge effectiveness of the initiative.⁴⁴

Strategic Documents and Guidance

Current strategic guidance impacting installation management within DoD begins with the national strategy. In January 2012, the DoD issued *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. This document states that "the

⁴³Inspector General, Report Number DODIG-2012-054, *Marine Corps Transition to Joint Region Marianas and Other Joint Basing Concerns* (Alexandria, VA: Government Printing Office, February 2012), 2.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 4.

Department must continue to reduce the cost of doing business. This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy.”⁴⁵ This strategic guidance mirrors the central purpose of this thesis and directly ties to other DoD guidance such as the “Defense Installation Initiative” which provides more concrete guidance directly on installation management.

In 2004, DoD issued its first Defense Installations Strategic Plan. This plan built on the Defense Installations Posture Statement issued in August 2001 and the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan.⁴⁶ The Defense Installations Strategic Plan falls directly under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics and is grounded in the 2006 QDR direction to implement “enterprise-wide changes to ensure that organizational structure, processes, and procedures effectively support DoD’s strategic direction.”⁴⁷ Additionally, both the Global War on Terrorism and the Global Defense Posture and Base Realignment and Closures 2005 are supported through the Defense Installations Strategic Plan.⁴⁸

⁴⁵Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2012), 7.

⁴⁶Department of Defense, *2007 Defense Installations Strategic Plan*, www.aco.osd.mil/ie/index.html (accessed 5 December 2012), 4.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

While the *Defense Installations Strategic Plan* applies to all DoD activities, each component must develop their own specific installation assets and services plan aligned with the DoD plan. In broad terms, the DoD goals are:

1. Right size and Place: Locate, Size, and Configure defense installation assets to meet the required capabilities of military forces
2. Right Quality: Assess and deliver installation capabilities needed to provide effective, safe, and environmentally sound living and working places in support of DoD missions
3. Right Risk” Protect personnel, property, and mission capabilities through informed risk decisions at the appropriate level of leadership
4. Right Resources: Balance resources and risks to provide high quality installation capabilities, and to optimize life-cycle investment to support readiness
5. Right Management Practices: Continuously improve installation planning and operations by embracing best business practices and modern asset management techniques
6. Right Workforce: Develop a high performing, agile, and competent workforce⁴⁹

Specific areas within the plan which apply to the premise of this thesis include Objective 1.1 which refers to reshaping “the overall structure of installations within the United States to better support the DoD Components (including Washington Headquarters

⁴⁹Ibid., 5.

Services) and joint warfighting needs.”⁵⁰ This first objective emphasizes “an array of ranges and sites not traditionally thought of as installations that must be factored into these master plans” and seeks to “improve operating efficiencies and meet all BRAC 2005 requirements.”⁵¹

Likewise, Objective 1.2 calls for reshaping “the structure of installations abroad to better support individual Military Services and joint warfighting needs”⁵² Along the same lines, Objective 1.4 calls for optimizing the “Department’s existing facility space to enhance operational efficiencies and war fighting effectiveness, the means and strategies” and notes that “while DoD has always supported joint use of installation assets, more consolidation and integration of activities are possible” and that “DoD has chartered a team to revise policies, processes, procedures, and practices to enhance joint installation support, establish a common set of business rules and processes for common delivery of installation support, establish common output level standards, and minimize management overhead.”⁵³ The measures for Objective 1.4 include “Implementation of milestones for the development of joint basing criteria (2008),” developing “common criteria for joint utilization of facilities (2008),” and reporting “percentage of assets meeting joint use criteria (annually starting in 2009).”⁵⁴

⁵⁰Ibid., 6.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., 8.

⁵⁴Ibid.

COLS are discussed under Objective 2.4 within the document as providing “operationally efficient installation support services.” COLS are designed to “Develop common definitions, performance standards, and performance metrics for installation support functions to assist in managing limited resources” as well as “More closely link the warfighting requirements to Installation Support” and to “Promote the Common Delivery of Installation Support at consistent levels and provide the basis for Interservice Support Agreements between DoD Components”⁵⁵

DoD already has implemented other systems such as the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), the Facilities Modernization Model (FMM) and the Facilities Operations model (FOM) to standardize procedures throughout the department. DRRS is the “single integrated, web-based readiness reporting system for the Department of Defense” while FMM is “DoD’s tool to establish annual funding benchmarks for facilities modernization investments.”⁵⁶ Each of these systems serves to highlight the continued efforts within DoD to centralize control and improve information flow for installation management activities across the department. Other DoD supporting policies and regulations further support the concepts and systems emplaced by the strategic level documents originating in OSD.

DoD Policy and Regulation

Current DoD Directives require the military departments to execute several installation management related tasks. These tasks can be divided between real property

⁵⁵Ibid, 12.

⁵⁶Ibid., 29-30.

and basing. The Secretary of Defense delegates responsibility to each of the departments for “construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and natural resources.”⁵⁷

Likewise, each department is also responsible to “develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and provide administrative and logistical support for all assigned forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.”⁵⁸

It must also be noted however, that each department is required to coordinate with the other departments “to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration; eliminate duplication; and assist other DoD Components in the accomplishment of their respective functions by providing . . . facilities, equipment, supplies, and services, as may be required.”⁵⁹ Likewise, the departments are required to “consult and coordinate with the other Military Services on all matters of joint concern.”⁶⁰ While neither of these functions inherently changes by the creation of a Defense Agency for installation management, they are however formalized through a more rigid oversight and administration that would act as a forcing function for compliance in this area. The delegation to the departments for real property and basing

⁵⁷Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 21 December 2010), Enclosure 6, 25.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 26.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 29.

execution would necessarily have to be modified to limit military department responsibility to an advisory role while providing personnel to the joint organization.

To assist with standardization of aspects of installation management functions, DoD has already begun consolidations of the various standards. Uniform Facilities Criteria (UFC) and Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS) are an example of an area where DoD has already begun this process. While not encompassing every possible scenario, UFC/UFGS are to be used “by the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies and the DoD Field Activities for planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization of facilities, regardless of funding source.”⁶¹ Dating back to the late 1990s, UFC/UFGS established for the first time “a unified design guidance program in accordance with House Conference Report 105-247, dated 9 September 1997, and the tri-service *Unified Design Guidance Report* to the congressional defense committees, dated March 1998, and as directed by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) letter dated May 2001 and DoD Directive (DODD) 4270.5 dated February 12, 2005.”⁶² UFC/UFGS are developed and approved jointly, marking a departure from the way DoD had previously developed and approved facilities specifications. UFC/UFGS is not all encompassing however and is continually revised. For special circumstances outside its current scope, existing service specifications are used until UFC/UFGS is revised.

⁶¹Under Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, *Department of Defense Uniform Facilities Criteria* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 29 May 2002).

⁶²Department of Defense, MIL-STD-3007F, *Practice for Unified Facility Criteria and Unified Guide Specifications* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2006).

Another example of an area where DoD has made recent progress towards more jointness within the installation management field is in the security area. In 2009, public law 111-84 amended Title 10 USC to require the Secretary of Defense to set new, unified “access standards applicable to all military installations in the United States.”⁶³ This represents a key step in the right direction as previously, each service, and in many cases, each installation commander, set seemingly arbitrary installation access procedures and physical security rules. The long term goal expected by a “unified” standard is a common access procedure that will take the uncertainty out of base entry for the joint force.

Current DoD Organization

While the first part of chapter 4 has dealt with the requirements in which the installation management systems operate, the second part will take a closer look at individual organizational structure currently in place within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and within each of the Military Departments. In order to better understand where DoD should be heading, we must first look at our current structure across the service components and DoD activities. Only through a comparison of existing capability and legacy structure can an assessment be made regarding how the Department’s current installation posture fits into existing federal law, Presidential guidance, and DoD directive.

⁶³Public Law 111-84, Division A, title X, Sec. 1073(c)(11), 28 October 2009, 123 Statute 2475.

DoD Structure

DoD's installation management oversight structure lies primarily within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD(I&E)). This office is organized underneath the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics within OSD. The DUSD(I&E) is divided into a number of offices and directorates including: Basing, Business Enterprise Integration, Chemical and Material Risk Management, Environmental Readiness and Safety, Facilities Energy and Privatization, Facility Investment and Management, Housing and Competitive Sourcing, the Office of Economic Adjustment, the Defense Explosives Safety Board, the Armed Forces Pest Management Board, the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program, and the DoD Siting Clearing House for renewal energy projects.

Major functions relating directly to the services' implementation of installation management rest within the various directorates of DUSD(I&E). These include BRAC and Joint Basing under the Basing Directorate; Real Property Accountability, Energy Management, and Chemical Management programs under the Business Enterprise Integration Directorate; environmental programs information and guidance via the Defense Environmental Network Exchange under the Environmental Management Directorate; oversight and policy concerning Sustainment, Restoration and Installation Management, demolition, modernization, and construction through the Facility Investment and Management Directorate; energy policy and guidance through the Facilities Energy and Privatization Directorate; and policy, implementation, and oversight of military housing programs via the Housing and Competitive sourcing

directorate.⁶⁴ The installation management oversight functions organized under DUSD(I&E) logically follow the characteristic of being mainly “engineering” type areas commonly referred to as public works, or alternately as business type functions typified by the BRAC, energy and privatization, and economic adjustment offices.

Noticeably absent is any organization of services such as Morale, Welfare, and Recreation, community services, or installation security. Many of these remaining installation management functions fall under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness which is responsible for health affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management, including equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation, and quality of life matters.⁶⁵

While the organization within DoD is set up to allow for consolidation, the SECDEF assigns responsibility to an Under Secretary as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) responsible for supervision of each Defense Agency and DoD Field Activity in accordance with section 192 of Title 10, USC. The PSA is then responsible to “exercise authority, direction, and control over designated Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, ensure the continued effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and performance of designated Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, [and] be accountable to the

⁶⁴Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment, “About I&E,” http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/ie_orgchart.shtml (accessed 23 September 2012).

⁶⁵Department of Defense, website, <http://www.defense.gov/orgchart/#20> (accessed 23 September 2012).

Secretary of Defense for the mission performance of designated Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities.”⁶⁶

While this structure works for management areas that fit neatly within the division of labor amongst the Under Secretaries, a consolidated Installation Management Agency would extend beyond the purview of the assigned PSA, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). As a result, other Under Secretaries would necessarily have a stake in the functions of a consolidated, joint organization should it be designated as a Defense Agency. Clearly, any consolidation of installation management and execution functions across DoD would require a reexamination of this relationship as well. Having dual oversight from OSD to an agency or command does not necessarily have to be problematic. Given clearly delineated responsibilities, no major structural changes might need to occur at OSD level.

⁶⁶Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5001.01, Enclosure 2, 13.




Figure 2. Office of the USD(A,T&L)

Source: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment, <http://www.defense.gov/orgchart/#23> (accessed 23 September 2012).




Figure 3. Office of the DUSD(I&E)

Source: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Installations and Environment, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/ie_orgchart.shtml (accessed 23 September 2012).

Army Structure

History and Function

The Army defines Installation management as “the process of directing and integrating the provision of all functions, to include base support, MILCON, and Army family housing, as well as the resources needed to operate the installation on a day-to-day, long-term, and strategic basis.”⁶⁷ Recognizing the need to run its installation more effectively, the Army restructured the entire way it manages its installations over the last twenty years. During the 1980s and early 1990s a number of inspections, studies, and

⁶⁷Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 2011-2012* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2011), 422.

surveys advised that installations could be managed far more efficiently and effectively than by existing organizational structures. As a result, the Army leadership took the following actions:

- (1) Establishment of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) in 1993
- (2) Establishment of centrally selected garrison commanders in 1993
- (3) Establishment of pre-command courses for both garrison and installation commanders in 1994
- (4) Publication of FM 100–22, *Installation Management*, in 1994 (first installation management publication)⁶⁸

These actions began standardizing installation management functions which previously had varied widely between installations and often competed with operational priorities for funding.

Among its reasons for consolidating “base support” functions from the 15 different MACOMs that had been responsible prior to IMA standing up, the most concerning was the siphoning of base operations (BASEOPS) funding to meet OPTEMPO requirements. This routine practice, which eventually led to the Congressional fencing of certain “earmarked” funding areas later, compounded other problems with the legacy system such as inconsistent standards between installations and MACOMs, poorly managed infrastructure, and diversion of operational units’ time and purpose for installation management issues. Often, the legacy system created a “haves and have not” environment that was detrimental to the Army’s overall health.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Burbach and Van Pool, 8.




Figure 4. Army Legacy Installation Structure

Source: Jeffrey B. Burbach and J. Elise Van Pool, eds., “Installation Management Command: A Short History 2011-2010,” *Army Publishing Directorate*, October 2010, 8.

On 1 October 2002, the Army activated the Installation Management Agency (IMA) to better support the Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) initiative. The SECARMY’s intent for TIM was to:

- (1) Provide corporate structure focused on installation management.
- (2) Support and enable Mission Commanders
- (3) Enable Army Command (ACOM) Commanders to provide strategic guidance via the Installation Management Board of Directors (IMBOD)
- (4) Eliminate usage of Installation Support dollars (BASOPS, Environment, Family Programs, Base Communications, SRM) to support mission activities
- (5) Achieve regional efficiencies
- (6) Provide consistent and equitable services through established standards.
- (7) Integrate Reserve Components.
- (8) Enhance Army Transformation.
- (9) Support Information Technology (IT) and contracting centralization efforts.⁷⁰

In October 2006, the Army again revised its operating model and activated the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) to succeed IMA. IMCOM’s mission was “to provide the Army with the installation capabilities and services to support

⁷⁰Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs*, 422.

expeditionary operations in a time of persistent conflict, and to provide a quality of life for Soldiers and Families commensurate with their service.”⁷¹

With the activation of IMCOM, the Army’s installation management structure was transformed into an integrated command structure. This consolidation included:

- (1) Family, Morale, Welfare and Recreation Command (FMWRC)
- (2) Army Environmental Command (AEC)
- (3) Reorganization of IMCOM commands and headquarters structures
- (4) Identification of IMCOM as a Direct Reporting Unit under the modular force structure
- (5) Dual hatting the IMCOM Commander as the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM)
- (6) Transfer of the HQ to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, as part of BRAC 2005 in September 2011.⁷²

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

IMCOM HQ ORGANIZATION




Figure 5. IMCOM Headquarters Structure

Source: U.S. Army Installation Management Command, IMCOM Regulation 10-1, *Organization, Mission, and Functions U.S. Army Installation Management Command* (San Antonio, TX: Government Printing Office, June 2011), 3.

Under the new IMCOM command structure, the ACSIM is dual hatted as the IMCOM Commander and elevated to a three star general officer. The CG IMCOM/ACSIM is supervised by the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and interacts with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA) Installation, Energy and Environment (IE&E) and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA). The ASA IE&E sets the strategic direction, determines objectives, establishes policy, sets standards and proposes programming and funding for Army

installations and real property while the ASA M&RA establishes Army policy and standards for people, quality of life, and well-being programs. The Commander IMCOM is responsible for execution of both ASA's under Title 10 USC 3013(b) and is authorized direct communication with Army Commands (ACOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), other Direct Reporting Units (DRU), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), other DoD headquarters and agencies, and other government departments for matters of mutual interest.⁷³

IMCOM's worldwide responsibilities are broken down into four geographically based regions, East (Atlantic) and West (Central) Regions in CONUS, Pacific Region, Europe Region, plus Korea. The Korea region is headed by a brigadier general while all other regions are headed by a civilian SES Regional Director (RD). RDs are rated by the IMCOM DCG and senior rated by the ACSIM/IMCOM Commander. Garrison Commanders (GC) are then rated by Region Directors and senior rated by the designated Senior Commander (SC) for an installation. This rating scheme "keeps the SC linked to the base support process and optimizes mission support."⁷⁴ The role of the RD then is to supervise the Garrison Commander and provide direction, guidance, and programmatic oversight for all Installation Management Services. Additionally, the RD manages all IMCOM resources within the region, provides budgeting and programming guidance,

⁷³U.S. Army Installation Management Command, IMCOM Regulation 10-1, *Organization, Mission, and Functions U.S. Army Installation Management Command* (San Antonio, TX: Government Printing Office, June 2011), 4.

⁷⁴Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs*, 423-424.

allocates resources to garrisons, and tracks budget implementation in accordance with published IMCOM funding guidance.⁷⁵

The Senior Commander is normally the senior general officer at the installation. The SC is responsible for the care of Soldiers, Civilians, and Families to enable unit readiness and will resolve installation issues with IMCOM, the associated ACOM, ASCC, or DRU. This position is normally dual hatted as both Senior Commander and as a Mission Commander. The SC is responsible for synchronizing and integrating Army Priorities and initiatives at the installation. While the SC commands the installation, the funding for nearly all installation activities flows through the RD.⁷⁶

At the garrison level, each installation managed by IMCOM is headed by a Garrison Commander or Garrison Manager who “leads the organization, supervises the daily management of all respective IMCOM services, assigned to the Garrison’s Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), delivered to the installation and its resident activities, and directs the implementation of policies, procedures, and program necessary to accomplish assigned mission.” Specifically, the IMCOM Garrison Commander is responsible for:

- (1) Commands assigned/attached activities
- (2) Formulates policy for, directs, supervises and coordinates the operation of the garrison directorates/offices
- (3) Is responsible for the delivery of respective Installation Management services to all resident and non-resident activities

⁷⁵U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), *2010 Installation Management Community Leader Handbook*, February 2011, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/22249060> (accessed 5 December 2012), 7.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*

- (4) Cultivates the Army Garrison role in local community affairs to advance interests/quality of life of Soldiers and Families of the installation and ensure public support
- (5) Under the guidance of the SC, exercises direct authority for the development and execution of force protection plans for the installation
- (6) Under the guidance of the SC, exercises tasking authority over resident activities for resources to ensure delivery of installation support services and execution of installation contingency plans
- (7) Sets installation-wide policy as delegated by the SC
- (8) Oversees Garrison Appropriated Fund/Non-Appropriated Fund budget planning and execution
- (9) In coordination with the SC, sets priorities for Sustainment, restoration, and modernization (S/RM) resources
- (10) In coordination with the SC, sets priorities for Military Construction Army (MCA)
- (11) In coordination with the SC, establishes the installation master plan.⁷⁷

Each Garrison is organized to provide services under the Standard Garrison Organization (SGO). SGO sets the structure for delivery of Common Levels of Support (CLS) and achieves a common way of managing installation worldwide. It is a core model that is flexible and is sized to meet mission requirements. It is managed two levels down from the Garrison Commander (Directorate and Division level). Structure below Division level is approved by the RD. The CG, IMCOM can approve modification to meet non-standard organizational needs at specific installations.⁷⁸ The garrison is staffed under SGO as follows:

- (1) Equal Employment Office
- (2) Installation Safety Office
- (3) Directorate of Emergency Services
- (4) Directorate of Human Resources
- (5) Directorate of Training, Mobilization and Security
- (6) Resource Management Office
- (7) Directorate of Public Works
- (8) Directorate of Family, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

⁷⁷Ibid., 8-9.

⁷⁸Ibid., 12.

- (9) Plans, Analysis, and Integration Office
- (10) Staff Judge Advocate
- (11) Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office
- (12) Directorate of Logistics (transfer to AMC in 2012)
- (13) Public Affairs Office
- (14) Religious Support Office
- (15) Information Management Office.⁷⁹

STANDARD GARRISON ORGANIZATION (SGO)




Figure 6. Standard Garrison Organization

Source: U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), *2010 Installation Management Community Leader Handbook*, February 2011, <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/files/22249060> (accessed 5 December 2012), 13.

⁷⁹Ibid., 9-12.

Other Considerations:

Reimbursement for Army Tenants on other than Army (OTA) installations – Generally, the ACOM, ASCC, or DRU programs and budgets for their interservice/intra-governmental support costs IAW DODI 4000.19. Enclosure 6 lists the inter-service support agreement (ISSA) services that are normally reimbursable or non-reimbursable to the Army tenant on an OTA installation.⁸⁰ This same relationship holds true for other component personnel assigned to Army Installations and is captured through the Army Stationing and Installation Planning System (ASIP). The ASIP feeds data on population and location for Army Installations to generate requirements and future funding levels.⁸¹ Additionally, existing “caretaker” relationships continued as of 2010 for existing support arrangements until an Army-wide transition plan and policy could be developed without interrupting support to Army units on OTA bases. In such an arrangement, the IMCOM garrison providing baseline authorized support continues to program the costs through MDEP managers and the II PEG.⁸²

Stationing, as used in the ASIP, is the physical location of units, represented by a Unit Identification Code, location, and population data. This information becomes of the utmost importance since, under the current budgetary structure, individual garrison receive funding commensurate with their population data as reported in ASIP. If the ASIP data is not correct, they receive improper Soldier support funding. Likewise, the situation is further complicated as any DoD Agency, Field Activity, or other military

⁸⁰Ibid., 28.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

department personnel must be accounted for and “funded” through a series of resource management (G-8) budgetary transfers in accordance with a prearranged and mutually agreed to Inter Service Support Agreement (ISSA). The management of ISSAs presents a considerable time investment as any changes to increase or increase the level of support provided in turn causes the ISSA to be renegotiated.

The repositioning of units and transforming of posts in accordance with The Army Campaign Plan has resulted in over 1,800 individual unit actions through the end of Fiscal Year 2013, many of which involve ISSAs. The ACSIM, in coordination with HQDA, G-3 and G-8, support CG FORSCOM, CG USAREUR, and CG USARPAC in developing stationing options for Brigade Combat team (BCT) activations and unit stationing resulting from the 2003 Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) and the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) decisions.⁸³ This work will continue over the next few years as the Army adjusts the number of its Brigade Combat Teams, resulting in additional stationing analysis for which IMCOM must play a significant role.

As a final note, it must be mentioned that although IMCOM controls the vast majority of Army installations, it does not manage them all. Army Reserve/National Guard (ARNG) installations remain under National Guard Bureau (NGB) and state/territory management. Some special installations likewise continue to be controlled by their respective ACOM, ASCC or DRU.”⁸⁴ Given the rarity of these special

⁸³Department of the Army, *How the Army Runs*, 427.

⁸⁴U.S. Army Installation Management Command, Regulation 10-1, 4.

circumstances and the scope outlined in chapter 1, such exceptions will not impact conclusions and recommendations for this thesis.

Air Force Structure

Like the Army, The Air Force's installation management organization begins at the secretarial level with Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment and Logistics. This office is divided into three divisions: Environment, Safety and Occupational Health; Installations; and Logistics. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Installations) mission is to "provide policy and oversight for the Air Force's \$6 billion annual installation programs" to include:

- 1) Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of Air Force Military Construction (MILCOM), Military Family Housing (MFH), Nonappropriated Fund (NAF), and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) facility programs.
- 2) Acquisition, purchase, lease, and disposal of real property
- 3) Base Conversion and realignment
- 4) Strategic basing and utilization
- 5) Community planning and air installation compatible use zone program oversight
- 6) Oversight of privatization of military family housing and utilities
- 7) Approval authority of Joint Use Agreements
- 8) Partnerships with state military defense task force groups
- 9) Coordination of non-Air Force requests to use Air Force facilities⁸⁵

With installation management functions previously divided among the Office of Installations, the Air Forces Real Property Agency (AFRPA), the Office of Energy, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, recent ongoing changes are redefining the Air Force's organizational constructs at the strategic level.

⁸⁵United States Air Force Installations, Environment, and Logistics, Website, <http://www.safie.hq.af.mil/organizations/> (accessed 15 October 2012).

In December 2011, key Air Force leaders met at Lackland Air Base in San Antonio to discuss the consolidation of AFRPA, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE), and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA). By combining the three organizations, the Air Force would be able to consolidate top-level management of much of the installation management mission through creation of a "center of excellence in every measure and fashion of the word" that would oversee real property, environment, energy, installation operations and readiness.⁸⁶ The driving factor for this consolidation most likely was the current and foreseeable fiscal future. Of the 4,500 civilian positions identified for elimination in 2012, roughly 3,850 positions are from headquarters and overhead functions. This strategy was implemented by trimming positions from the Air Staff, major command staffs, field operating agencies and direct reporting units with some 1,700 of the cuts coming directly from the installation support field.⁸⁷

Despite the recent consolidation effort, the Air Force continues to operate on a model completely different from the current state of the other services. This consolidation into a single center essentially affects the portion of installation management that the Army would refer to as Public Works. The remainder of the "services" are split across a number of organizations for technical oversight, the majority falling under the Air Force

⁸⁶Air Force Real Property Agency, "'Super FOA,' Civil Engineer Transformation Focus of Leadership Meetings," 2 December 2011, <http://www.safie.hq.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123281968> (accessed 15 October 2012).

⁸⁷Association of Defense Communities, "Installation Support, Headquarters Functions Absorb Brunt of Air Force Downsizing," *Defense Communities* 360, 12 January 2012, <http://www.defensecommunities.org/installation-support-headquarters-functions-absorb-brunt-of-air-force-downsizing/#> (accessed 20 October 2012).

Services Agency (AFSVA). Formed in 1992 during a restructure of morale, welfare, and recreation and other services functions, AFSVA provides technical assistance, oversees fielding initiatives, sets policy, develops procedures, and manages some central support functions. Through a series of directorates, AFSVA manages communications-computer systems, food services, lodging, fitness, and readiness programs.⁸⁸ With only 750 employees, the agency is not involved in the day to day operation of any of these service areas, but instead serves more in an advisory and oversight role. A key difference with the Army's model is AFSVA's supervision of both appropriated and non-appropriated fund food services, clubs, dining facilities, and commercial operations all within one agency.

To understand the remainder of the Air Force's organizational structure for installation management, we must first examine its basic doctrine. The Air Force defines "Airpower" as resulting from "the effective integration of capabilities, people, weapons, bases, logistics, and all supporting infrastructure."⁸⁹ Additionally, Air Force doctrine holds that no one aspect of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities should be treated in isolation since each element is essential and interdependent. As such, supporting bases with their people, systems, and facilities become essential to launch, recover, and sustain Air Force forces. Noting that the "availability and operability of suitable bases can be the

⁸⁸United States Air Force, "Air Force Service Agency Fact Sheet," 15 February 2011, <http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=154> (accessed 5 October 2012).

⁸⁹United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command*, 14 October 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 20.

dominant factor in employment planning and execution,” the Air Force believes that control over such must remain under operational commanders.⁹⁰

As applied in an example of a joint environment, the Air Force tends to resist attempts by joint commanders to task organize into separate functional areas such as engineering, transportation, or medical task forces because it “divides Air Force assets among other component commanders and fractures Service unity of command” and breaks the Air Force’s desired state of “unity of command and unity of effort under a single airman.”⁹¹ This concept holds for installation management as well as operational forces because the Air Force integrates installation management functions into its operational unit construct.

While noting that, “an installation commander, regardless of service, always exercises some authority over and responsibility for forces on his/her base,” the Air Force Service Component Commander within a region is responsible for “fulfilling ADCON responsibilities and common logistics support for all Air Force forces within his/her region, regardless of organization of assignment of those forces.” This responsibility is then delegated through the layers of the chain of command to the senior Air Force Commander at a given location.⁹² Bearing this in mind, at the Air Expeditionary Task Force Level (AETF), the Commander Air Force Forces’ (COMAFFOR) staff contains an A-7 Staff Officer (see figure 7) responsible for Installations and Mission Support. This director of installations and mission support is the COMAFFOR’s “primary advisor for

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., 84.

⁹²Ibid., 85.

installations, mission support, force protection, civil engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, fire fighting, emergency management, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear passive defense and response, contracting, and all cross-functional expeditionary combat support.”⁹³




Figure 7. Example Component NAF Structure

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 20.

At the Wing level, the mission support group provides base support and services. Within the Base Support Group, analogous to the Army’s old Area Support Groups, squadrons dedicated to force support, civil engineering, communications, contracting, logistics readiness, and security actually execute the “installation management” type

⁹³Ibid., 119.

functions (see figure 8). Within the Commander's staff reside the functions of plans, staff judge advocate, chaplaincy, equal opportunity, public affairs and the command post (see figure 9). Unlike IMCOM's model where these functions would essentially be duplicated or split in part between the installation responsibility and the tenant command responsibility, the Air Force's model relies on the unified operational structure to provide both roles.




Figure 8. Example Wing Structure

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 23.




Figure 9. Example Wing Staff

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 24.

Within the individual squadrons of the Base Support Group, support services are likewise broken apart. Nonappropriated Funds Financial Analysis is provided through the Comptroller Squadron in order to ensure independent financial management oversight and analysis of Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) and lodging programs and activities on the base, as well as other nonappropriated fund programs. Supported activities include the installation commander, the comptroller, and the force support squadron management. The Comptroller Squadron also contains the Local Area Network Support function which installs, configures, administers and provides for the maintenance

of squadron computer systems and equipment, essentially equivalent to DOIM functions.⁹⁴




Figure 10. Example Comptroller Squadron

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 20, 25.

Airfield Operations are likewise placed under the purview of the Operations Support Squadron which provides airfield management and air traffic control operations services to the base flying wing, transient users, and civilian users. These services include tower control, radar, operations, weather operations, and base operations functions (See figure 11). Recall that under the Army's model this function would have been organized

⁹⁴Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 20, 25.

under the DPTMS. Similarly, the Air Force splits out the Fire and Emergency Services portions of what the Army would call the DES and places them within the Civil Engineer Squadron alongside emergency management, asset management, programs, resources, asset managements, and resources (see figure 12). The remaining portion of DES, security, is aligned under another Squadron, the security forces squadron.




Figure 11. Example Operations Support Squadron

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 28.




Figure 12. Example Civil Engineer Squadron

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 49.

The remaining operational squadron to be discussed is the Force Support Squadron (see figure 13). Within this construct lie resource management, marketing, operations, unit training, manpower and personnel, sustainment, and the Airman and family services. Resource management is responsible for both appropriated and nonappropriated fund financial management, any private organizations, squadron logistics and property management, and squadron information technology while the marketing flight provides daily functional oversight and advice on marketing, commercial sponsorship and market research programs that support the appropriated and nonappropriated fund activities within the squadron. Marketing also ties in with the Public Affairs office to administer publicity.⁹⁵

The Installation Personnel Readiness is externally focused and provides installation-wide personnel deployment planning and execution as well as any required

⁹⁵Ibid., 46.

personnel support for matters pertaining to deployment. The Manpower and Personnel Flight, on the other hand, provides the installation with Manpower and Organization services and Personnel support for both military and civilian employees. Sustainment Services Flight provides life support functions such as food, fitness and lodging services for the installation. Club food and beverage operations are also included as well as casual/formal dining, banquet/catering operations; and stand-alone nonappropriated fund food operations.⁹⁶ This organization is much more convoluted than the Army's model where NAF is generally clustered in DFMWR. Likewise, during discussion of the Navy and Marine Corps this will hold true as commercial food operations are generally clustered under a MWR type organization.

The two organizations most closely resembling the Army's MWR within the Air Force Structure are the Airman and Family Services Flight (FSF) and the Community Services Flight (FSC). The FSF provides programs that respond to the needs of military members and their families including child development, family care and youth programs as well as referral counseling, leadership consultation, base family action plans, Relocation and Transition Assistance, and casualty and personal/family readiness functions. The FSC provides recreational activities including community centers, arts and crafts, outdoor recreation programs, activities and equipment checkout. It also provides food, beverage and entertainment programs through its bowling centers and golf courses, runs limited retail operations and hosts a number of special interest clubs such as aero clubs, rod and gun clubs, and stables.⁹⁷

⁹⁶Ibid., 47.

⁹⁷Ibid.




Figure 13. Example Force Support Squadron

Source: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 38-101, *Air Force Organization*, 16 March 2011, www.e-publishing.af.mil (accessed 5 December 2012), 47.

Navy Structure

Like the Army, the Navy began moving toward a unified command for its installation management when it stood up a new organization on October 1, 2003. The Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) is designated an “Echelon II” command under the Chief of Naval Operations and is responsible for Navy-wide shore installation management. The creation of CNIC was an effort in the continuation of fleet and regional shore installation management transformation beginning in 1997 with the reduction of installation management “claimants” from 18 to 8 and intended to establish a single shore installation management organization that focuses on installation

effectiveness and improvement of the shore installation management community's ability to support the fleet.⁹⁸ This change in organization construct is reflected in figure 14.




Figure 14. NAVFAC Realignment

Source: David Curfman and James Harris, "Naval Facilities Engineering Command: Environmental Business Line Overview and Compliance Opportunities" (Briefing, 22 June 2010, slide 2), <http://www.ncmbc.us/0910-0955MR3DEVBusinessLineOverview.pdf.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2012).

⁹⁸Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC) Headquarters, "History," http://www.cni.navy.mil/CNIC_HQ_Site/WhoWeAre/History/index.htm (accessed 12 August 2012).

Under this new construct, the Commander, Navy Installations Command has overall responsibility for shore installation management, exercises authority as the budget submitting office for installation support, and serves as the Navy point of contact for installation policy and program execution oversight. Unlike the Army's consolidated model however, the CNIC is divided into twelve regions as shown in figure 15. Also, of particular note are the differences in rank structure, civilianization of senior leaders, and dual-hatting of six of the twelve regions (figure 16).





Figure 15. CNIC Navy Shore Bases by Region and Facility Engineering Command

Source: David Curfman and James Harris, "Naval Facilities Engineering Command: Environmental Business Line Overview and Compliance Opportunities" (Briefing, 22 June 2010, slide 2), <http://www.ncmbc.us/0910-0955MR3DEVBusinessLineOverview.pdf.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2012).



CNIC Organization



As of 8 May 2012

Figure 16. CNIC Organization

Source: Commander Navy Installation Command, "CNIC Organizational Chart," http://www.cni.navy.mil/navycni/groups/public/documents/document/cnicp_a293400.pdf (accessed 12 August 2012).

The CNIC divides its operations into three Navy Shore Operations categories: Operations, Quality of Life, and Facilities Management. These categories break apart as follows:

- (1) Operations
 - a. Fleet Support
 - Airfield and Port Operations
 - Fuel and Supply Services
 - Weapons Storage
 - b. Force Protection and Security
 - Harbor Security
 - Force Protection

- Fire and Emergency Services
- Emergency Management
- Safety
- c. Training/Readiness
 - Shore Response Plan
 - Emergency Operations Centers
 - Training/Exercises
 - Range Operations
- (2) Quality of Life
 - a. Sailor and Family
 - Family Housing
 - Bachelor Housing
 - Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR)
 - Fleet and Family Support Sites
 - Child Development/Youth Programs
 - Galleys and Food Services
- (3) Facilities Management
 - a. Facility Support
 - Planning BRAC
 - Military Construction
 - Sustainment, Restoration, Modernization
 - Demo/Consolidation/Lay-up
 - Utilities, Facility Services
 - Vehicles, Equipment
 - b. Environmental
 - Compliance–Conservation
 - Pollution Prevention
 - Cultural
 - c. Encroachment⁹⁹

While many of the same “CLS” functions are present, the grouping of the individual services under the Navy model differs from the Army’s implementation. Facilities management corresponds to DPW in the Army model, however, under the Navy model vehicles and other equipment fall within the responsibility of the facilities management

⁹⁹Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC) Headquarters, “Navy Shore Programs,” http://www.cni.navy.mil/navycni/groups/public/documents/document/cnicp_a232883.pdf (accessed 12 August 2012).

branch. In the Army model, these functions would be included within the DOL.¹⁰⁰

Likewise, Galleys and Food Services corresponds to DFAC services which in the Army again falls under DOL, however, in the Navy model is located within the Sailor and Family life area. Also in the Sailor and Family Life grouping, Family and bachelor housing is arranged differently from the Army model where housing falls under the purview of DPW. The Training/Readiness grouping closely resembles DPTMS with the omission of airfield operations which under the Navy model fall under Fleet Support.

The single largest difference, however, lies in the lack of a truly unified installation management structure. Of the eight remaining “claimants” for installation management missions mentioned earlier, the most significant is the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. This organization most closely resembles a hybrid of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and IMCOMs Department of Public Works. (see figure 17 and 18) The relationship between the two organizations, both of which are “echelon II,” is one where the NAVFAC supports CNIC, but retains the actual control of most assets. In essence, rather than being vertically integrated like IMCOM, CNIC uses an outsourced model. This change of mission for NAVFAC came about in 2004 when it began transforming to better meet the new support requirements to CNIC. This transformation included combining former engineering field divisions, officer-in-charge of construction organizations, and Public Works Centers into regional Facilities Engineering Commands (FEC). (see figure 19 and 20)

¹⁰⁰IMCOM DOL functions are currently undergoing transition to AMC and DLA at the time of writing.




Figure 17. NAVFAC Organization Chart 1

Source: Naval Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters, Navy Facility Engineering Command website, https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/portal/page/portal/navfac/navfac_about_pp/tab5368686/navfac%20hq%20%20only%20july%202008.pptm.pdf (accessed 29 July 2012).




Figure 18. NAVFAC Organization Chart 2

Source: David Curfman and James Harris, “Naval Facilities Engineering Command: Environmental Business Line Overview and Compliance Opportunities” (Briefing, 22 June 2010, slide 2), <http://www.ncmbc.us/0910-0955MR3DEVBusinessLineOverview.pdf.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2012).




Figure 19. NAVFAC Organization Chart 3

Source: Naval Facilities Engineering Command, “NAVFAC Commands by Location,” https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/portal/page/portal/navfac/navfac_about_pp/tab5368686/navfac%20org%20chart.pdf (accessed 29 July 2012).




Figure 20. NAVFAC Commands by Location

Source: Naval Facilities Engineering Command, “NAVFAC Commands by Location,” https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/portal/page/portal/navfac/navfac_about_pp/tab5368686/navfac%20org%20chart.pdf (accessed 29 July 2012).

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps became the latest military service to establish a consolidated installation management command when Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM) was activated on 1 October 2011. MCICOM was organized under the Installations and Logistics Department, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps in Washington, D.C. with the mission to serve as “the single authority for all Marine Corps Installation Matters”

and as such “exercises command and control of regional installation commands, establishes policy, exercises oversight, and prioritizes resources in order to optimize installation support to the operating forces and tenant commands.”¹⁰¹ Based on studies ordered by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in September 2010, it was determined that the Marine Corps needed a single activity to bear responsibility for installation matters and to increase effectiveness of installation management and operations by clarifying command lines of authority and responsibility, standardizing installation functions to the greatest practical extent, overseeing resource prioritization, and ensuring installation support links directly to requirements and capabilities for warfighting tenant organizations.¹⁰²

MCICOM contains Marine Corps Base Quantico and three subordinate regional commands: MCIEAST, MCIPAC, and MCIWEST. Each Regional Commanding General reports directly back to the Commander MCICOM and also serves as the base commander for each of their bases: Camp Lejeune for MCIEAST, Camp Butler for MCIPAC and Camp Pendleton for MCIWEST. Each regional headquarters is collocated with the corresponding Marine Expeditionary Force. Interestingly, the Marine Corps elected to retain their training bases separately under the Training and Education Command (TECOM). These installations include Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command/Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Marine Corps Recruit

¹⁰¹United States Marine Corps, MARADMIN 575/11, *Activation of Marine Corps Installations Command (MCICOM)*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/messagesdisplay/tabid/13286/article/111014/activation-of-marine-corps-installations-command-mcicom.aspx> (accessed 5 December 2012).

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

Depot San Diego, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Paris Island, and the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center. Although these installations remain under the control of TECOM, installation funding flows from MCICOM through the regional MCIs to the individual installations. Requirements generation and installation matters likewise flow from the TECOM installations through the regional MCIs up to MCICOM.¹⁰³




Figure 21. MCICOM Structure

Source: CAPT Craig Fulton, Marine Corps Installation Command, "Regional Installation Facilities and Environment Overview Brief," 8 March 2012, <http://posts.same.org/coastalcarolina/Brief%208MAR12.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2012).

¹⁰³Ibid.

The Marine Corps' intent by establishing MCICOM and its new consolidated regions achieved both an increase in overall effectiveness and efficiency through elimination of certain redundant organizations. Speaking at the deactivation ceremony for Marine Corps Bases Japan and activation ceremony for MCIPAC, MG Peter Talleri stated:

From its inception, MCBJ has been a dual responsibility of the III MEF Commander, requiring him to concentrate his time and efforts on both installation, as well as his operational requirements. Today, as we deactivate MCBJ and activate Marine Corps Installations Pacific, we effectively free the MEF commander from directing installation functions and allow him to focus on his operational mission, secure in the knowledge that his Marines, sailors, civilians and their families have the facilities and services they need to train and deploy within the Pacific region. . . . With the establishment today of MCIPAC, the process will be realigned with a straight course from my office here at Camp Butler to the Commander, MCICOM for resolution.¹⁰⁴

By eliminating the overhead at not only Marine Corps Bases Japan, but its former counterparts in Korea, and Hawaii, the new streamlined organization contains all of the Pacific region bases under a single entity. This process was duplicated in MCIEAST and MCIWEST.

The Marine Corps made a conscious decision to build MCICOM as a lean organization. The headquarters and regional headquarters share similar staff structures outlined in a basic G-staff optimized for installation management consisting of only roughly 178 billets each depending on location. To achieve this the Marine Corps did not roll all 37 recognized installation management functions (See Appendix E) under MCICOM. MCICOM leverages the Command, Control Communications, and Computers

¹⁰⁴Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, "Marine Corps Activates Marine Corps Installations Pacific," <http://www.dvidshub.net/news/77808/marine-corps-activates-marine-corps-installations-pacific> (accessed 20 October 2012).

Department at HQMC for oversight of its information systems while regional installation personnel administration centers and human resources offices assume much of its personnel management functions. Likewise, MCICOM does not control the community service functions that remain separate under Marine Corps Community Services. Additional areas where MCICOM must interface with outside Marine Corps offices for installation management services include physical security, aviation services, fuels and explosive ordnance disposal, and energy.¹⁰⁵

One of the major challenges MCICOM must overcome is standardizing expectations for delivery of services, particularly in the impending lean environment. One of MCICOM's prime objectives is application of COLS as a means to do this. One of justifications for standing up MCICOM was the disparity in service delivery between installations. By application of COLS, it alleviates this problem and allows for equitable systems to adjust delivery downward from a systematic approach as part of the budgetary process. As Major General Kessler, CG MCICOM stated, "As budgets begin to tighten and we need to change the service levels we are providing, we can do so in a way that is clearly defined and understood."¹⁰⁶

In this chapter we have examined both the written documentation authorizing or requiring the Department of Defense and each of the military departments to operate in a certain manner as well as the individual organization for installation management within

¹⁰⁵Staff, MCICOM, "MCICOM and its Importance to Every Marine," *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 2012): 23.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 24.

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Clearly, there is currently no one “right” answer although several trends are clear.

First, there is a general trend among the departments to consolidate oversight if not execution. While each department has undertaken this concept differently, it is not surprising given their different histories and mission. While, the Army opted for the behemoth organizations all under one umbrella in the form of IMCOM, the Navy chose as supported/supporting relationship as it stood up CNIC and restructured NAVFAC’s mission. Likewise, the Marine Corps aligned only its operational bases under MCICOM to better fit its unique MEF model and in accordance with its “lean” policies left out major “MWR” and services from MCICOM’s domain. The Air Force on the other hand, while recently consolidating portions of its management structures, continues to remain the sole outlier by retaining virtually full control of services delivery at the local commander level within its operational structure and opting for a more flat organizational structure with oversight coming from multiple agencies and commands at the upper echelons.

Second, there is a trend to standardize throughout the Department of Defense. With the recent exception of the multiple variants of combat uniforms notwithstanding, DoD directive, policy, and guidance has pushed the services to “speak with one voice.” While much interpretation of the standards is currently still allowed, getting the military departments on the same sheet of music through DRRS, COLS, and common definitions is the first step to being able to ensure a standardized delivery level across DoD. When viewed in terms of the entire Department of Defense, economies of scale are produced when, rather than each department individually delivering a services program or

independently developing a new system, a combined product that meets the general need can be procured at a reduced cost.¹⁰⁷

Finally, there seems to be a growing recognition within the installation management field, to varying degrees depending on the military department, that the status quo is no longer going to be acceptable. From energy efficiency campaigns to regional consolidation and manpower studies, each military department has embraced the need for change. With impending deeper cuts to personnel and funding, necessity seems to be the driving factor. While the Air Force remains the most unchanged for many valid reason to date, one only need to look back to another of the Army's reasons for moving away from an operational installation management structure: harvesting of uniformed positions from the Area Support Groups in order to maintain higher priority warfighting functions.

¹⁰⁷31 USC, Sec. 1535.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

While the previous chapters have outlined the challenges facing DoD and dissected the issue from an organization perspective, this section will answer the central question of the thesis, summarize conclusions based on the previous analysis in chapter 4 and make several recommendations for the way ahead. Specifically, this chapter will answer the central research question of whether, given the current environment, the Department of Defense should consider consolidation of its installation support functions under the umbrella of a single DoD agency so it might achieve greater efficiency, standardize support across DoD, and increase the ability of the department to operate jointly as per the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

To that end, three assessment criteria will influence the findings. First is whether or not consolidation is supported by current published strategic guidance. The next criterion is if consolidation would be in compliance with, and meet the intent of, existing federal law. Third is the degree to which consolidation helps the Department of Defense pursue increased jointness. Each of these criteria will be applied to answering the three main questions arising from my research: whether consolidation is supported, the degree to which DoD is structured to support a consolidation, and what DoD should do. The final portion of this chapter will deal with the challenges that exist.

Is Consolidation Supported?

In answering the central research question of this thesis, based on the examination of existing public law, the consolidation of installation management functions across

DoD would be supported by existing law. The degree to which a consolidation occurs would determine the applicability and restriction of the law. Because of the individual service responsibilities outlined in 10 USC for “construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property,” DoD must tread carefully as if it would seek to execute a consolidation without fundamentally stripping the individual military departments’ responsibilities.¹⁰⁸ This is not to say that Congress would not interpret service input and participation in a joint organization as fulfilling the obligation under 10 USC, however, the probability remains that in order to realize such a consolidation, a modification to 10 USC would most likely need to occur. As 10 USC is routinely modified as needed, this does not present a major impediment to change, rather, a necessary step that must occur in the process.

DoD clearly already has sufficient authority to establish a new command or agency so long as it provides “for the performance, on a DoD-wide basis, of a supply or service activity that is common to more than one Military Department when it is determined to be more effective, economical, or efficient to do so.”¹⁰⁹ While, further studies are needed to determine the exact cost avoidances and savings, based on previous BRAC examples and joint basing, one infers that significant savings would be realized through consolidation by elimination of overhead and duplicated services. While most of the expected savings through such a consolidation would be realized from the military

¹⁰⁸10 USC, sec 3303.b(12).

¹⁰⁹Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5001.01, Enclosure 7, 36.

components, other agencies and services would also yield significant savings if incorporated into a consolidation plan.

An example of potential savings from other areas within DoD is that in the national capital region (NCR), the Washington Headquarters Service (WHS) serves as the DoD field activity responsible for administering operational programs and providing operational support and administrative services to DoD Components and certain non-DoD activities. While much of the WHS mission falls outside the installation management realm, it is responsible for the DoD administrative space management program. Its mission also entails facilities management and associated support services for all DoD occupied administrative space in the NCR and other locations including: real property and building management; administrative space acquisition and management; maintenance, repair, alteration, design and construction; safety and environmental management; renovation program planning and execution; concessions, childcare, parking management, office services, administrative telephone service, graphics and presentations services; transportation matters, to include the mass transportation subsidy program and scheduled DoD bus services; Physical, technical, and information security, law enforcement, traffic control, force protection, and anti-terrorism and passive counter-espionage programs for the Pentagon and other DoD-occupied administrative facilities in the NCR and for designated DoD officials at non-DoD facilities in the NCR, as required.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5110.4, *Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19 October 2001), 1-4.

DoD organizations such as the WHS could be reduced in scale by aligning their missions under the consolidated Defense Installation Management Agency. It can be expected based on the previous consolidations of other DoD agencies and the model shown by joint basing that a certain level of overhead would be reduced as well as allowing the WHS to focus on its wide range of other unique missions. Likewise, similar benefit could be achieved by aligning other organizations' functions such as the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) under the proposed Defense Installation Management Agency. The PFPA mission of providing "force protection, security, and law enforcement to safeguard personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and other resources for the Pentagon Reservation and for assigned DoD activities and DoD-occupied facilities within the National Capital Region (NCR)" is not substantially different from functions a consolidated installation management agency would necessarily perform.¹¹¹

How well is DoD structured to support consolidation?

While a restructured installation management apparatus would present one of the most complex transformations to date, it is not impossible. DoD has much of the apparatus in place already to support such a transition. While formalization of the relationships at the OSD level would require formalization of responsibilities for oversight, much of this would be dependent on the ultimate structure chosen by DoD. Should a "split model" like the Navy or Marine Corps where engineering type facility and basing functions fall under the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions,

¹¹¹Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5105.68, *Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 19 December 2008), 1.

Technology and Logistics while and most services fall under the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, major changes would not be required. In the event of an IMCOM-like solution however, major changes to align installation management under a single entity would require OSD to select the principal which most closely mirrors the overall mission of the new agency.

As far as the ability of DoD, as currently organized, to execute such a solution, there are numerous areas where problems would most likely develop. Most of these areas are due to the different interpretations or division of labor between the different military services. Much of this friction can be overcome by clear identification of standards at OSD level and willingness across DoD to enforce those standards. Allowing continued service divergence or non-compliance with existing DoD standards serves to weaken the intent of unified standards and runs counter to the intent of Goldwater-Nichols. An example of this, and a key area that would be improved by consolidation, is in the area of physical security. Not only do standards differ between the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, but even within the Army currently. IMCOM's management of installation security is complicated by the fact that multiple agencies have responsibility. For example, the provost marshal general reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army as the program manager for the Army Installation Entry (AIE) program. Likewise, USNORTHCOM, as the executive agent for antiterrorism, issues security directives for their area of operations.¹¹² More centralized management of such programs is needed to ensure “programmatic fratricide” does not occur.

¹¹²Department of the Army, Army Sciences Board FY2009 Summer Study, *Installations 2025* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 34.

This situation is replicated for the other services as well. For instance, within emergency management, each service “has taken a different approach to implementation” for mass notification systems tied to physical security and emergency services.¹¹³ Not only is this inefficient, but also quite costly as up to four different solutions are produced. Consolidation would immediately clarify situations like this as the standard would immediately become a DoD standard without room for variation. To continue along this line, in 2009 the Army Science Board’s in-depth study concluded that “Multiple organizations in OSD and the Army provide policy direction, guidance, technology and requirements without sufficient IMCOM involvement resulting in lack of effective installation command and control at the garrison level.”¹¹⁴ Bearing in mind that IMCOM, as the military service component installation management entity having the most authority by far, still faces challenges executing its responsibilities due to the complex system in which it operates. In fact, one of the principal conclusions from the Army Science Board’s look at future installation management issues found that “the IMCOM commander today has inadequate authorities commensurate with his responsibilities to fulfill mission requirements in 2025.”¹¹⁵

As outlined previously within chapter 4, there are also numerous cases of each military department having a different method of implementation for how it delivers various services and at what levels. It is easy to look to joint basing as an example of what a garrison might look like under a consolidated agency but one would be wrong to

¹¹³Ibid., 35.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 34.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 2.

do so for several reasons. First, in formulating the COLS, the highest standard was used rather than determining the most appropriate. While not necessarily bad, this does represent an increased overall cost to implementation should DoD pursue this path, rather than dictating the terms of what will be acceptable levels for COLS. Likewise, the organizational structure at joint bases was not standardized along a “SGO” type model, rather existing structures were modified. At San Antonio for instance, an Air Force joint basing structure, a brigadier general commands a joint base wing with three subordinate support groups located at each of the San Antonio locations.¹¹⁶ Meanwhile, due to the difference in how the Army organizes, a colonel would be responsible for the same, or greater, span control. This results directly from the Air Force’s inclusion of operational responsibilities in its model and complicates joint models. As shown in the Air Force’s organization structure analysis, separating these integrated functions is extremely difficult at present, without a major transformation.

Joint basing gives a glimpse of what the initial phases of such a consolidation might look like but the existing waste within DoD is widespread. A 1998 War College Strategic strategy paper noted:

In this era of military downsizing and the combining of service functions, certain facilities are sometimes shared by collocated installations (such as a neighboring Army and Air Force base), but they are still service-pure installations located in close proximity to each other. Ironically, many of these individual installations are not used to anywhere near their capacities. There is considerable merit in their consolidation.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Air Education and Training Command.

¹¹⁷Wesley E. Hood, “Another Way to Manage Installations: Safeguarding Scarce Resources for the Future” (Research Project, US Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1998), 4.

Unfortunately, too little has changed since this statement. Joint basing, while a step in the right direction, accounts for a mere 12 installations out of hundreds. As mentioned above, it did little to standardize the delivery of services beyond the accounting procedures set by DoD, which are still widely interpreted between the services. Thus, there is still no true single standard capable of supporting the joint force concept with regards to basing.

In summary, for consolidation to work, DoD would need to make a concerted effort to better identify standardized levels of support and enforce standardized delivery of those commons levels of support. Organizational models across the services would need to be modified to match up to that new structure to some degree, and in doing so, would lay the foundation for a later consolidation.

What DoD Can Do

When considering DoD's range of options with regards to the future of installation management as we have defined it, one can safely rule out maintaining the status quo. Clearly, the Department must take meaningful actions in light of the current operational environment of fiscal restrictions. While consolidation of DoD's installation management functions is a desired endstate perhaps, it is not a goal that can be realized in the near term. Given the complexity of such a merger, certain interim steps can, and should, be taken as soon as possible.

The first thing DoD can do to facilitate improved operations now and lay future groundwork for a consolidation is to improve supervisory controls at the OSD level. Historically, the services have been given a wide leeway to decide how and at what levels to interpret DoD guidance for installation management areas. Clear guidance with strict deviation guidelines will assist with this shortcoming. Comprehensive rules will assist in

this. Also, clearly choosing a model and delineating responsibility for lead agent within OSD for future efforts will streamline the process. Along these lines, standardization of COLS based on researched, agreed upon, and logical delivery levels will assist DoD in future cost control in the event of either a further expansion of the joint basing concept or the complete consolidation of installation management. In the end, defense leadership needs to select the appropriate standard and apply it across the board, rather than allowing migration to the highest standard to appease the service components.

The next area where DoD should focus its energy is in capitalizing on the lessons learned from Joint Basing, specifically in the implementation of identified best practices across the Department. By continuing to identify what constitutes a best practice on a joint base, DoD essentially has a sampling of a standard for a future consolidation. This is not to say that carefully thought out, and justified, exceptions should not be allowed, but for the majority of DoD, best practices identified on joint bases should be applicable as a forcing mechanism to standardization. Some best practices may not come from joint bases however. There is no reason at this point that if one military department consistently executes more efficiently than its peers that DoD should not seek to standardize that practice across the board.

Perhaps the most controversial recommendation is that DoD should consider mandating a similar organizational structure for each of the military departments for how they structure themselves to supervise and deliver installation management services. Clearly, DoD must first identify the optimum structure and then study the costs associated with such a mandate. Any such broad-reaching decision must be based in a methodical process wherein DoD first executes manpower studies, preferably using

objective, measurable metrics. Applying appropriate personnel rules will ensure an accurate study is produced which can assess the true personnel requirements, including grade structure. While manpower intensive, there is no other way to accurately capture the potential cost savings associated with a mandated restructure effort in anticipation of eventual consolidation.

There is no doubt whether DoD must address the changing installation management field. Joint basing gave us a sample of what lies ahead as the Army Sciences Board's 2009 study concluded "joint basing will become more dominant. Multiple services and government agencies will be located at one installation. Mega installations will require more education and skills for garrison leadership."¹¹⁸ For DoD to recognize this now and take appropriate steps to include installation management transformation into the long range Defense planning will enable the department to set the foundation for ultimate success. Consolidated joint education for installation management leaders centered around implementation of the above recommendations would serve to build the next generation of DoD leaders who will be ready to implement any future solutions the department deems appropriate. Establishment of a Joint Installation Management Career field would be a method of building and maintaining the required expertise. Either way, DoD must continue existing lines of effort in the installation management area and determine its way ahead after careful study and consideration with regards to overall long range strategy.

¹¹⁸Department of the Army, *Installations*, 58.

The Challenges Ahead

The single largest challenge facing the Department of Defense should it continue to pursue more joint installation management methods, whether in the form of a consolidated agency or simply through tightened controls, is changing the organizational mindset. Legacy parochial politics within DoD remains ingrained in our collective consciousness. Even today, senior military department leadership remains openly apologetic for taking necessary and prudent actions to realign forces which may result in the closing of some installations. For example, the Air Force's most recent posture statement commented that:

Due to the magnitude of the budget decline, our programmed reductions are wide-ranging, directly impacting over 60 installations. Thirty-three states will be directly impacted, but all 54 states and territories will be affected in some way by the proposed aircraft and manpower reductions. Although some squadrons will actually grow larger, it is unlikely that there will be a 100 percent backfill of personnel or alternative mission for every location. Without the Total Force re-missioning actions we are proposing, these reductions would have significantly affected 24 units and left eight installations without an Air Force presence.¹¹⁹

As a whole, DoD has to begin putting the collective good of the nation ahead of internal service priorities, as established by Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense. Whether or not an installation closes or is left without a presence of a particular branch of service should not be the overriding concern. Rather, the questions DoD should be asking are whether by realigning the department is saving money, operating more effectively, or operating more efficiently.

Looking back to the challenges in initiating the Joint Basing concept, as the first joint bases were about to reach operating capability in 2008, former Air Force Secretary

¹¹⁹United States Air Force, *Air Force Posture Statement 2012*, <http://www.posturestatement.af.mil/> (accessed 5 December 2012), 8.

Michael W. Wynne commented that he “did not think giving Hickam to the Navy made sense. I don’t think giving Andersen to the Navy makes sense . . . the Air Force has a very different concept of operations in managing its bases.”¹²⁰ Echoing Wynne’s comments, former Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley argued that Air Force bases, presumably unlike Army, Navy, or Marine Corps bases, are not “just some place we deploy from” and that the Air Force must “ensure we can still conduct our missions.”¹²¹ The former Air Force Chief of Installations, William C Anderson, again referenced this ingrained reluctance to relinquish operational control of installation funding when he testified before Congress saying that “our operational commanders should define the requirements necessary to execute the mission and manage the funds to meet their needs.”¹²²

Much like the Army leadership before them as IMA stood up, these senior Air Force leaders attempted to use the justification of “operational needs” in their opposition to joint basing implementation to give credence to a belief within their branch that the future health of the force was at risk because of joint basing. By describing a conceptual model that the USAF contains a more mature, highly skilled, retention-driven force than the Army’s younger, recruitment-based force of soldiers, they attempted to sabotage the success of joint basing. Likewise, they reinforced the ever present fear that joint basing would create “lowest common denominator” facilities standards that would drive out the

¹²⁰Adam J. Hebert, “Joint Base Dispute,” *Air Force Magazine* (October 2008): 30.

¹²¹*Ibid.*

¹²²*Ibid.*

kind of airmen with families that the USAF seeks to retain.¹²³ Ironically, the opposite happened as COLS migrated to the “highest common denominator” instead. Despite this, attitudes are beginning to change. The Air Force provisional Commander of Joint Base Elmendorf- Richardson noted in a 2008 article that while “gutting the Air Force community by removing quality of life or communal support facilities and infrastructure will be a life-altering change for many . . . it grows ever more costly” and must be balanced against the risks of failing to modernize.¹²⁴

As far back as 1996, GAO noted that “despite the recognized potential for savings from interservicing, differing service traditions and cultures, and concern over losing direct control of support assets, often cause commanders to resist interservicing.”¹²⁵ The Army’s initial transition to IMA occurred in this difficult environment, similar to what a modified Navy and Air Force structure or a consolidated DoD level structure would face. There was significant institutional opposition to the change however. Human resources concerns over the reassignment or realignment of personnel and chronic under-resourcing impacted the transition. A 2007 IMA study showed that after transition, IMA received only two-thirds the money the MACOMs had previously received to manage installations.¹²⁶ If DoD should choose to conduct such a consolidation of installation management functions, this last lesson must be retained.

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Vinger, 25.

¹²⁵Government Accountability Office, *Military Bases*.

¹²⁶Burbach and Van Pool, 9.

A prime example illuminating the inherent challenges associated with establishment of a unified installation management command or agency lies with DoD's efforts to establish a unified medical command. Although a 2011 GAO report found that "the responsibilities and authorities for DOD's military health system are distributed among several organizations within DOD with no central command authority or single entity accountable for minimizing costs and achieving efficiencies," consolidation of DoD medical assets into a unified command remains a difficult issue.¹²⁷ The GAO cited a 2001 Rand Corporation report studying this issue which determined that since the 1940s there have been at least 13 separate studies addressing organization of the military health care system and all but three of those studies recommended a unified health care system or stronger central authority.¹²⁸

DoD went so far as to establish a working group in 2005 to determine the new command structure but due to an inability of the services to agree. Although backed by both the Army and Navy, Air Force Surgeon General LTG James G. Roudebush argued in 2006 that loss of inclusion in "the Commander's circle of trust" and loss of "a homogenous medical capability" would threaten the Air Force's ability to perform its current and future missions and remain "doctrinally coherent and culturally coherent."¹²⁹

¹²⁷Government Accountability Office, *Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2011), 13.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*

¹²⁹LT. Gen James G. Roudebush, "Remarks at the 2006 Air Force Defense Strategy and Transformation Seminar Series, Washington, 15 November 2006," <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Today's+commitment%3A+transforming+military+medicine.-a0157195305> (accessed 27 October 2012).

This much cited “cultural difference” resistance instead led DoD to pursue a compromise series of incremental steps towards more joint medical operations including establishment of a Defense Health Agency, three of which were based in BRAC requirements.¹³⁰

DoD’s chosen course of action for this area is expected to yield \$221 million annual savings, while the original unified command plan, although involving a lengthy implementation period and a debatable upfront cost, would have yielded the Department an expected \$460 million annually.¹³¹

Clearly, the Defense Department’s experience in attempting to consolidate its medical assets serves as a potential example of the challenges it can expect during an attempted reorganization of its installation management assets. As already shown through the resistance to joint basing, deep seated bias by some key leaders at the flag officer rank contribute to this “cultural resistance.” Simply put, without a changing of the guard to a new generation of leaders who will put the overall good of the Department of Defense and the nation ahead of their individual service desires, consolidation of installation management functions would fare in much the same manner unless specifically directed by Congress.

Regardless of challenge however, consolidation of installation management across the department is an idea that both DoD and Congress should pursue. While we may not be ready to immediately execute such a monumental transformation given the numerous incremental steps which must first occur, consolidation remains an important idea which may be proven in the end as a method to maintain key existing programs

¹³⁰Ibid., 14.

¹³¹Ibid., 16.

while reducing the overall cost within DoD. Only further, careful study to quantify this idea grounded in both existing federal law and DoD guidance will lead to an optimized solution that best serves DoD and the Nation. This research will hopefully begin a dialog which in turn will spark further conversation concerning the merit of consolidation for installation management functions and lead to quantifiable research in turn which provides the impetus to make a meaningful change that will benefit each of the military branches in the end.

GLOSSARY

Common Delivery of Installation Support (CDIS). “The framework to provide for the optimum consolidation and consistent delivery of installation support at established DoD common output level standards.”¹³²

Common Levels of Support (CLS). CLS is “a coordinated, corporate strategy for transforming installation services management by focusing on service delivery costs and performance. Through CLS, the Army expects to achieve three objectives:

Standardized installation services: Installation customers receive the same elements of service, to the same level of service, regardless of the installation at which they are located (flexible for unique missions, geographic or demographic considerations)

Accountability for service delivery performance: Garrisons report service delivery performance quarterly and are held responsible for meeting performance targets

Equitable distribution of available resources: Available resources will be distributed effectively across garrisons so each has adequate resources to deliver installation services to an expected standard.”¹³³

Common Output Level Standards (COLS). “Output or performance level standards established by the Department of Defense for installation support using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output performance metrics, and cost drivers for each installation support function. These standards provide a description of the capability associated with the particular installation support function. Where appropriate, standards will be tiered to provide options for managing risk.”¹³⁴

Cost Avoidance. “Cost avoidances are defined as all cost reductions that are not savings. These can include, but are not limited to, improvements in efficiency, reductions in unit cost, and reductions in the projected cost of unfinanced requirements.”¹³⁵

Cost Reduction. “A cost reduction is a reduction in the number of dollars needed to meet a customer-established requirement by executing a certain process or function. All cost reductions are categorized as savings or cost avoidance.”¹³⁶

¹³²Department of Defense, DoDI 4001.01, *Installation Support*, 1.

¹³³Wilson.

¹³⁴Department of Defense, DoDI 4001.01, *Installation Support*, 1.

¹³⁵IMA Business Improvement-Lean Six Sigma, 1.

Cost Savings. “Savings are defined as cost reductions that enable a manager to remove programmed or budgeted funds and apply them to other uses. In this definition, savings are viewed from an Army-wide perspective: an initiative that reduces costs in one organization or appropriation but increases costs elsewhere represents savings only to the extent that there is a net cost reduction that can be applied to other uses.”¹³⁷

Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security. A directorate within an IMCOM garrison that functions similar to the S-3 Operations section of an operational Army unit.

DoD Executive Agent. “The Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. . . . The DoD Executive Agent, or subordinate designee, may arrange for and execute inter-Service support agreements, in accordance with DoD Instruction 4000.19, memoranda of understanding, and other necessary arrangements, as required, to fulfill assigned DoD Executive Agent responsibilities, functions, and authorities. . . . Within the scope of assigned responsibilities and functions, the DoD Executive Agent's authority takes precedence over the authority of other DoD Component officials performing related or collateral joint or multi-component support responsibilities and functions.”¹³⁸

Emergency Services. A field within installation management containing those services required to address emergency conditions. Dependant upon which military service, this area may contain Fire and Emergency Services (ambulance capability), Security Personnel, and Military Police or equivalent.

Facilities Modernization Model (FMM). “Provides a prediction of program and budget requirements for facilities modernization. FMM does not include those requirements already covered in the other cost models.”¹³⁹

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Ibid., 3.

¹³⁸Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5101.1, *DoD Executive Agent* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 3 September 2002, incorporating change 1, 9 May 2003), 2-3.

¹³⁹Department of Defense, DoDI 4001.01, *Installation Support*, 1.

Facilities Operations Model (FOM). “Provides a prediction of program and budget requirements for facilities operations. FOM does not include those requirements already covered in the other cost models.”¹⁴⁰

Facilities Sustainment Model (FSM). “Provides a prediction of program and budget requirements for facilities sustainment. FSM does not include those requirements already covered in the other cost models.”¹⁴¹

Installation. Any base, camp, post, station, yard, depot, center, or other area under the control of the Department of Defense or a military department. This includes areas located outside the United States. Smaller installation are often referred to as sites or sub-installations depending on the military department.

Installation Assets. “All Natural and constructed assets associated with owning, managing, and operating an installation, including the facilities, people, and internal and external environment.”¹⁴²

Installation Management. The functional area within DoD concerning all aspects related to both facilities management and support services delivery. Categorization and organization for service delivery varies by military department.

Installation Services Model (ISM). “Provides a prediction of program and budget requirements for Installation Services. ISM does not include those requirements already covered in the other cost models.”¹⁴³

Installation Support. “Any of the five categories of services and support activities through which the Department of Defense engages in life-cycle management of its installations: Facilities, Services, Family Housing, Environment, and Base Realignment and Closure. Program element definitions for facilities, environment, and other installation support functions are maintained by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) and Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE).”¹⁴⁴

Military Department. “The executive part of the department and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the department. When used with respect

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹IMA Business Improvement-Lean Six Sigma, 1.

¹⁴²Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, *Installations Posture Statement*, 4.

¹⁴³IMA Business Improvement-Lean Six Sigma, 1.

¹⁴⁴Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, *Installations Posture Statement*, 4.

to the Department of Defense, such term means the executive part of the department, including the executive parts of the military departments, and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of Defense, including those of the military departments.¹⁴⁵

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR). A grouping of support and leisure services provided by any one of a number of different agencies or commands depending on which military department one is referring to. When used by the Army it becomes FMWR adding Family to the term. MWR activities are funded by a combination of appropriated funds and non-appropriated funds (NAF) collected through business operations. MWR activities benefit Soldiers, their families, civilian employees, and military retirees.

Real Property. As related to installation management this term refers to the land itself, any permanent physical structures such airfields, parking lots, buildings, cement pads, and fencing, or infrastructure such as utilities, sewer, roads, etc. found on a DoD installation.

Services. Any of a number of categories of support provided to individuals and military organizations falling under the umbrella of installation management. While organization and method may vary, service delivery is common to the management processes of each military department.

¹⁴⁵10 USC Sec. 101(a)(6).

APPENDIX A

JOINT BASES BY PHASE OF IMPLEMENTATION

Phase I Joint Bases* (Established on October 1, 2009)

Joint Base Andrews–Naval Air Facility Washington
Andrews Air Force Base and Naval Air Facility Washington

Joint Base Little Creek–Fort Story
Naval Expeditionary Base Little Creek and Fort Story

Joint Base Myer–Henderson Hall
Fort Myer and Henderson Hall

Joint Base McGuire–Dix–Lakehurst
McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst

Joint Region Marianas
Naval Base Guam and Andersen Air Force Base

Phase II Joint Bases* (Established on October 1, 2010)

Joint Base Anacostia–Bolling
Naval Station Anacostia and Bolling Air Force Base

Joint Base Charleston
Charleston Air Force Base and Naval Weapons Station Charleston

Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson
Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Richardson

Joint Base Langley–Eustis
Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis

Joint Base Lewis–McChord
Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base

Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam
Naval Station Pearl Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base

Joint Base San Antonio
Lackland Air Force Base, Fort Sam Houston, and Randolph Air Force Base¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶Inspector General, 23.

APPENDIX B

JOINT BASE INSTALLATION SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

Joint basing categorized installation support into 49 functions. In limited cases, specific joint bases were exempted from providing all 49 installation support functions because of either BRAC recommendation number 146 or decisions made by DoD leadership.


1. Airfield Operations
2. Base Support Vehicles and Equipment
3. Child and Youth Programs
4. Civilian Personnel Services
5. Command Support
6. Custodial Services
7. Emergency Management
8. Environmental Compliance
9. Environmental Conservation
10. Environmental Restoration
11. Facilities Demolition
12. Facilities New Footprint
13. Facilities Sustainment
14. Facilities Restoration and Modernization
15. Family Housing Services
16. Financial Management
17. Fire Protection and Emergency Services
18. Food Services
19. Grounds Maintenance
20. Information Technology Services Management
21. Installation Chaplain Ministries
22. Installation History and Museums
23. Installation Law Enforcement Operations
24. Installation Movement
25. Installation Physical Security Protection and Services
26. Installation Public Affairs
27. Installation Safety
28. Laundry and Dry Cleaning
29. Legal Support
30. Lodging
31. Management Analysis
32. Military Personnel Services
33. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
34. Nonappropriated Funds/Exchanges
35. Pavement Clearance
36. Pest Control
37. Pollution Prevention

- 38. Port Services
- 39. Procurement Operations
- 40. Readiness Engineering
- 41. Real Property Leases
- 42. Real Property Management/Engineering Services
- 43. Refuse Collection and Disposal
- 44. Small Arms Range Management
- 45. Supply, Storage, and Distribution
- 46. Supply, Storage, and Distribution (Nonmunitions) or Logistics Services
- 47. Unaccompanied Personnel Housing Services
- 48. Utilities
- 49. Warfighter and Family Services¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 24.


APPENDIX C

IMCOM REGIONS



Legacy IMCOM Region Map

Source: Jeffrey B. Burbach and J. Elise Van Pool, eds., “Installation Management Command: A Short History 2011-2010,” *Army Publishing Directorate*, October 2010, 10.



The Regional boundaries were reset to better align IMCOM resources to optimize Regional command and control and geographical dispersion.

Restructured IMCOM Regions MAP

Source: Jeffrey B. Burbach and J. Elise Van Pool, eds., "Installation Management Command: A Short History 2011-2010," *Army Publishing Directorate*, October 2010, 32.

APPENDIX D


IMCOM COMMON LEVELS OF SUPPORT BY LINE OF EFFORT

Soldier and Family Readiness LOE 1	Soldier and Family Well-Being LOE 2	Leader and Workforce Development LOE 3	Installation Readiness LOE 4	Safety LOE 5	Energy LOE 6	Other Areas of Emphasis No LOE
8 - Military Personnel Services	10 - Army Community Services	14 - Continuing Education Services	24 - Retail Supply	9 - Substance Abuse	44 - Heating/Cooling Services	16 - Visual Information Processes
23 - Ammunition Supply Services	11 - Child and Youth	140 - Education Learning Centers and Army Personnel Testing (VOPR)	26 - Asset Management	68 - Fire and Emergency Response Services	45 - Water Services	17 - Administrative Services
25 - Central Issue Facility	12 - Sports, Recreation, and Libraries		27 - Materiel Support Maintenance	95 - Installation Safety and Occupational Health	46 - Waste Water Services	69 - Program/Budget
28 - Transportation Services	13 - Business Operations		31 - Facilities and Maintenance - Training and Ops		47 - Electrical Services	70 - Support Agreement/MOU/MOU Management
301 - Mobilization and Deployment Support	21 - Installation Security Program Management Support		36 - Facilities - Army Family Housing		48 - Other Utility Services	72 - Installation TDA Management
306 - Training Support Center	22 - Anti-Terrorism Services		39 - Facilities Maintenance - Medical/Hospital			73 - Management Analysis
307 - Battle Command Training Center	29 - Food Services		40 - Maintenance - Improved Grounds			84 - Public Affairs
	30 - Laundry and Dry Cleaning Services		41 - Maintenance - Unimproved Grounds			94 - Internal Review
	50 - Family Housing Management		42 - Utilities, Dams, & Others			
	51 - Army Lodging Management		43 - Maintenance - Surfaced and Unsurfaced Areas			
	52 - UPH/SEBQ/BOQ Management		53 - Facilities Engineering Services Management			
	75 - Emergency Management		54 - Master Planning			
	77 - Law Enforcement Services		55 - Real Estate/Real Property Administration			
	78 - Physical Security		57 - Custodial Services			
	79 - Administrative and Civil Law		58 - Indoor Pest Management			
	80 - Criminal Law and Discipline		59 - Outdoor Pest Management			
	81 - Client Services		60 - Refuse Removal			
	82 - Claims		61 - Snow, Ice and Sand Removal			
	83 - Religious Support		64 - Conservation Programs			
	92 - EEO (Equal Employment Opportunity)		66 - Compliance Programs			
			67 - Pollution Prevention Programs			
			91 - Installation Management			
			300 - Command and Control			
			302 - Airfield Operations			
			304 - Training Land Sustainment			
			305 - Range Operations			

Source: Department of the Army. *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 2011-2012* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 2011), Appendix E.

APPENDIX E

MARINE CORPS INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS



Source: Marine Corps Installations Command, "MCICOM Civilian Review Briefing," 20 September 2012, <http://www.mcicom.marines.mil/Portals/57/Docs/USMC%20Core%20Business%20Model%20as%20of%20Jun%202012.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2012).

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